Trim runaways

Good evening everybody. Thanks for joining us for this Safety Review of 2025 workshop brought to you this evening by Astral Aviation Consulting on behalf of the UK Civil Aviation Authority.

Over the next 75 minutes, we're going to break the workshop down into some easily digestible chunks, and we're going to cover three themes which have all been the subject of recent AAIB investigations and our work with the CAA. These are safety themes that the CAA’s GA Unit would like to cover with you, and we welcome your engagement and your thoughts as we go through this.

The three themes are: autopilot and trim runaways, fuel testing and draining, and a bit of loss of control.

There will be plenty of time for Q&A as we go through, and we'd love you to take part. We've got the Q&A box and the chat box as well. I'd like to introduce my fellow presenters. Delighted to have Charlotte and Phil with us again. They're familiar faces to some of you who have attended these before. I'll let them introduce themselves next.

If you haven't met me before, I'm Matt Lane. I'm Head of Training, a Senior Examiner with the CAA, and an active single- and multi‑engine flight instructor. I'll hand over to Charlotte.

Hello, good evening everyone. I'm Charlotte Dadwell. I've been flying for over 20 years, instructing for 16, and I'm a full‑time instructor and Head of Training.

Thanks, Charlotte. And Phil—great to have you with us again.

Hi, good evening everybody. My name's Phil. It's a pleasure to be with you this evening. My career has spanned the RAF and the civil sector. I've flown the Tornado, Hawk, and Typhoon in the Air Force as a frontline pilot and instructor. I currently fly for Virgin Atlantic. I flew the Jumbo, and previously flew for Thomas Cook. I'm also a general aviation FI and do some display flying in my spare time. It's a pleasure to be here this evening and I'm looking forward to our discussion.

Brilliant. Thanks, Phil. If you want to stay in the loop with events and resources, please sign up to our mailing list. You can do this by going to our website, www.astralaviationconsulting.com, or by using the link that has appeared in the chat box. Signing up will also give you access to a replay of this workshop, so you don't have to take notes, and you can revisit anything you'd like. There are also a host of safety resources available.

Someone mentioned that the chat box wasn’t connected. We've posted the link, and Sophie, who’s handling the tech for us in the background, will take a look. Zoom has had these issues before, but hopefully Sophie will reset it shortly.

We're going to start with a poll. Many of you will have seen the polls before. This is just to get you familiar with them and to give us a bit of information about who we've got in the audience this evening. If you're watching on YouTube, you won't be able to interact with the poll on Zoom, but we'll make sure you get the answers as we go through.

So, what aircraft do people mainly fly? We know many of you fly lots of different types, but which one do you mainly fly? That should be up on the screen.

And if we could have a look at the results, please. Brilliant. Lots of single‑engine piston. Great to have some of our microlight and glider TMG community, some MEP, and quite a few from the gyrocopter community with us this evening as well. That's brilliant. Everybody is welcome, and we hope we will cover all perspectives and we welcome perspectives from everybody as well.

So, the first section is about autopilot and trim runaways. Before we get into this, I'll just answer a comment: someone mentioned they can see the link but can’t post in the chat. Sophie is working on that in the background, but we'll keep pressing on for now.

We're going to start this topic with a poll to get you thinking. If we can have the poll on screen, please.

These polls are a little more detailed tonight, but they should get you thinking.

In the event of an electric pitch‑trim runaway, especially at low altitude, what do you think is the most critical action to take? We’ve got a few options:

• Immediately pull the master switch

• Pull the circuit breaker

• Maintain control and disengage the autopilot or electric trim

• Select full opposite pitch trim

• Check flap position and adjust as necessary

Okay, let’s have a look at the results. The majority have gone for B: maintain control of the aircraft, and that is the answer we were looking for.

The master switch and circuit breakers are important, and we’ll discuss them shortly. There are lots of switches for different systems, but the key point is: maintain control and disable the autopilot or electric trim. Look out for that theme—we’ll come back to it.

Right. The case studies we’re going to discuss relate to AAIB investigations. Sadly, some involve fatalities. If any of you were connected to these accidents, you have our condolences.

We are not attributing blame or commenting on anyone’s abilities or decisions. We are using the AAIB reports and their recommendations to support a safety discussion, so we can all take away something useful for our future flying.

We’re going to look at two AAIB investigations to highlight how trim and autopilot malfunctions can rapidly become problematic.

The first is G‑Bravo Kilo Juliet Whiskey. This accident happened in July 2023 near Bagby Airfield. It was an Aztec. The pilot was returning from Ireland after a long multi‑sector day, and everything looked routine until the aircraft turned onto right base for Runway 06.

Radar and CCTV showed a progressively steepening descent. The aircraft suddenly entered a 30–40° dive from around 1,000 feet, with no visible attempt at recovery. It struck trees and terrain almost wings‑level, followed by a severe post‑impact fire.

Investigators found the pitch‑trim drum 3 mm from full nose‑down—essentially fully nose‑down. They considered post‑impact movement but noted it was more nose‑down than any expected trim setting for the speeds observed.

A trim runaway, possibly related to the inoperative but partially powered autopilot, was considered the most likely cause, though it couldn’t be proven due to the condition of the wreckage.

The autopilot was placarded unserviceable but still partially powered. The aircraft lacked a yoke‑mounted autopilot disconnect switch, and the relevant circuit breakers were low and out of sight. The pilot had not completed differences training on the Aztec, which may have been a factor.

In essence, at low altitude, a pitch‑trim excursion left the pilot with insufficient time or leverage to recover.

The second case involves N761JU, an American‑registered aircraft. This happened at Leeds East in April 2024. The pilot had flown two previous legs that day and had intermittent autopilot trim warnings.

On the final departure, during the take‑off roll at about 70 knots, the pilot attempted rotation but the control column wouldn’t move. He rejected the take‑off, but as power came off, the aircraft briefly became airborne.

With full nose‑down trim set, the pilot couldn’t hold the nose up. The aircraft bounced, the nose gear collapsed, and it inverted. Sadly, the passenger later died from injuries, though the pilot survived.

The elevator trim was found fully nose‑down. The autopilot system had intermittent faults and was capable of driving the trim wheel fully without the pilot noticing.

The autopilot switch was found in the ON position by fire‑crew personnel, suggesting the autopilot was engaged.

This accident highlights how an unnoticed trim position—or trim being driven by a faulty autopilot—can create a situation where the aircraft becomes uncontrollable at a critical moment.

It’s quite handy. It’s in the corner, bottom right, so it’s easy to get to quickly, which helps. Positioning is another factor — if it’s in the middle of a bunch of breakers, it’s harder to find. So highlighting becomes even more important.

Yes, having coloured collars around them helps. I think Nigel mentioned that as well — being able to identify them quickly is really important. If you can’t fit a collar for some reason, you might consider paint or another marking method. Speak to your maintenance organisation about that.

Interesting comments from people flying aircraft with only electric trim and no manual trim reversion — that’s quite unusual. Quite a few people are flying Diamonds as well. Those familiar with Diamonds will know the autopilot and trim are integrated; there isn’t a separate trim‑on switch on many models, and no separate circuit breaker. It’s all part of the autopilot CB. So knowing the system and having proper differences training is really important.

I’ll pick up a question from Clive: no one has mentioned slowing down. A trim runaway in a fast aircraft causes high forces — slow down and the forces reduce. Any thoughts on that, Phil?

Yes, absolutely. It comes down to flying the aircraft. Trim forces decrease as you slow down. For those flying higher‑performance aircraft, slowing down is a great way to reduce the problem. In larger, faster aircraft, slowing down is one of the vital actions. It applies equally here. It’s a great point.

Someone else mentioned electric‑trim‑only microlight types, which is interesting — how you manage the threat of a trim runaway and recover from it. Definitely worth discussing.

Another question: could the problem be mitigated by not engaging the autopilot until established in the cruise? Yes. One of the things I often ask on tests is: when can the autopilot be engaged? Many people don’t actually know. The flight manual will specify the lowest altitude at which autopilot use is permitted.

For example, on some twins — the DA42, for instance — the autopilot is not permitted with one engine inoperative. Some people don’t realise you can’t use the autopilot when asymmetric. So again, read your flight manual and understand your specific type.

Final question before we move on: someone asked whether having a breaker for electric trim is mandatory, as their aircraft has electric trim but no isolation.

I would say that some means of isolating the electric trim — either a switch or a circuit breaker — would be a mandatory requirement. For certified aircraft, that would certainly be expected. Charlotte, I don’t know if you’ve come across anything different in LAA permit types?

I would think the LAA would also require it, but I’m not entirely sure. I haven’t personally come across types without isolation.

 …any others with that. It’s a good question, and we’ll look into it and take it away. Someone mentioned — thank you, Godfrey — that for LAA types it is compulsory as well.

Regarding the accidents and reports, we will get the links to you. Even if we don’t manage to drop them into the chat tonight, the links to all these accident reports will be included in the post‑event email. You’ll be able to access them there. If you simply Google the registrations shown, they will also come up.

Right. Quite a few questions there, and some very good ones that I didn’t want to miss — that’s why I picked them up. But let’s move on to fuel in the next section and get you engaged again. So, let’s have another poll.

I’m glad the chat is working again. Sophie must have worked some magic in the background — thank you, Sophie.

Poll three: You arrive at the aircraft. It’s been parked outside. You drain the left wing. The sample tube is completely full of clear liquid that smells faintly of avgas. What’s the best course of action? You’ve drained the tank, you’ve got the liquid out, you’ve smelled it — it smells of avgas. What now? Options:

• Accept the sample

• Drain another sump

• Continue draining

• Start the engine and check for normal running

Hopefully everyone has had a chance to read through that. Let’s look at the answers.

95% selected: Continue draining the sump until you are certain no water remains, using visual comparison and settling time. Brilliant — that’s exactly the answer we were looking for, and we’ll discuss why with another case study.

This next accident report is based on a special bulletin — the full report hasn’t been released yet. A few of us, including Charlotte and myself, have been down to the AAIB to discuss this with the investigators and see some of the factors involved.

It concerns N4698W, a Rockwell Commander — a powerful aircraft. It suffered a loss of power on climb‑out due to severe water contamination in the fuel.

The aircraft departed Fife on 24 December 2024. CCTV showed the pilot arriving, conducting pre‑flight checks, and taxiing out. The engine had been running for about 20 minutes, suggesting a warm‑up or extended check.

Take‑off began just after 11:30, but less than a minute into the initial climb, CCTV footage showed the aircraft abruptly departing controlled flight, entering what was effectively an incipient spin.

At the same time, CCTV from a nearby village recorded the engine misfiring. The pilot made a brief Mayday call, but the aircraft struck rising ground near Kinglassie, and the pilot did not survive.

At impact, the landing gear was retracted, the propeller was windmilling, and there was no fire — indicating a sudden loss of power rather than a mechanical failure. Investigators found significant water contamination throughout the fuel system.

In the carburettor alone, enough water was present to cover the main jet inlet — the engine was effectively ingesting water instead of fuel. A significant and catastrophic situation.

Importantly, the AAIB found that even a full sample tube of water can still smell of avgas — Charlotte will touch on this shortly. This is a key learning point.

Charlotte, over to you for the learning points on this one.

Firstly, this was not a mechanical failure. The ignition system and engine components checked out correctly. The root cause was water contamination that had entered the fuel system sometime before the flight.

The Commander 112 has multiple sump drains — two per wing tank plus the gascolator. The POH requires draining all five points and repeating the drains until no water is present. If water is found downstream, such as in the gascolator, the wing and wheel‑well drains must be drained again.

…present, that even after one drain, subsequent samples might still contain water. The AAIB notes that pilots sometimes rely only on smell, but as we’ve seen here, a tube of pure water can retain a noticeable avgas odour if the tube was previously used for fuel. Fuel samples must be assessed primarily by sight, not smell, because water will always separate and sink to the bottom.

In addition to using a fuel‑sample tube to check for water, you can also check by pouring a small amount onto dry pavement. If water is present, it will bead into droplets because of surface tension. If bubbles form, you can step on them — air bubbles will pop, but water droplets will remain. If the sample is all water, it forms a distinct puddle, whereas avgas will continue to spread. These are different ways of identifying contamination.

Checking a fuel sample at night is more challenging. Hold the sample against a white backdrop, such as the fuselage, and shine a light from the side. The white background makes it easier to detect the colour of the fuel, and side‑lighting highlights debris and contaminants more clearly.

In this case, the aircraft had been outdoors for seven weeks with only the cockpit covered. The fuel‑cap seals had recently been replaced, indicating previous water‑ingress concerns. This should have prompted increased caution and repeated fuel sampling, particularly before the first flight after a long period outside.

Also note that the handling after the engine failure contributed to the accident outcome. The aircraft entered a stall or spin after the power loss, reinforcing the importance of flying the aircraft above all else in an engine‑failure‑after‑takeoff situation. Immediately pitch for glide speed, then assess what options are available.

Looking at the next slide, you can see the different fuel samples on the screen. The first is 100% avgas, the second is 100% water, and the third is a 50/50 mix. The water is colourless and sinks to the bottom beneath the avgas.

…to the bottom, sitting below the avgas in the right‑hand sample. You want to see a clear separation line. Be careful not to shake the sample and mix the layers — let it settle so you can clearly see whether any water is present.

Thanks, Charlotte. We’ll come to the takeaways shortly. Just look at those pictures — if you’re in a rush, some of those samples could look quite similar. But let’s talk about the takeaways, Phil.

Thanks, Matt. This incident underscores a critical message: water ingress is one of the main threats to piston aviation. Not long ago, I walked out to a PA‑28 that had both fuel‑filler caps left off overnight — an obvious case. But water ingress can occur in far more subtle ways, as Charlotte highlighted. Even well‑maintained aircraft flown by experienced pilots can be brought down by water that goes undetected during pre‑flight. That pre‑flight stage is what protects us.

Three key takeaways:

1. Drain all fuel sumps visually, repeatedly, and thoroughly. If water is found anywhere, keep draining until the samples are completely clear.

2. Do not rely on smell. A full tube of water can still smell of fuel — especially in flying clubs where sample tubes are used constantly. You simply cannot rely on smell.

3. Always take fuel sample before refuelling. Refuelling mixes any water with the fuel, meaning contamination may not show in a sample. It takes around 20 minutes for water to sink back to the bottom of the tank — the point where you drain it. So samples must be taken before adding fuel.

Another important point: never change fuel tanks prior to take‑off. Take‑off should be on the same tank used for the power checks. Always read your aircraft’s POH — some types require selecting each tank on the ground to check for proper fuel flow. But the key takeaway is: never switch to a tank that hasn’t been used for ground checks.

And finally, as Charlotte mentioned, be prepared for an engine failure after take‑off. This should be part of your TEM briefing. Be ready for the startle effect and know the correct immediate actions: close the throttle and move the mixture to idle‑cutoff. This keeps things simple and prevents the engine from suddenly firing back to life after you’ve committed to a forced‑landing plan.

These events are rare, thankfully, but they are deadly — and we avoid them through meticulous fuel checks on the ground before take‑off. Matt, back to you.

Thanks. A few people have commented, asking how the aircraft actually became airborne if there was water in the fuel. I’ve dealt with a couple of cases in my own flying schools where the fuel draw during taxi and even during a short power check is minimal. But as soon as you demand full power on climb‑out, that’s when the problem appears — often around 400–500 feet — because that’s when the engine draws a larger volume of fuel, and that’s when the water reaches the system.

Someone also asked what percentage of water will cause engine failure, and what percentage leads to rough running or partial power. Phil, I don’t think there’s a definite answer — it will be very type‑dependent.

Yes, it will vary by aircraft and engine type. The key is to carry out the pre‑flight checks properly and ensure there is no water present at all.

Another comment: if a substantial amount of water is found in the fuel, shouldn’t the aircraft be declared unserviceable? Yes — absolutely. That indicates something significant has gone wrong, and the aircraft needs to be inspected by a maintenance organisation.

Fuel icing can also be an issue. Someone asked when it’s recommended to change tanks for the first time. Charlotte, what’s your tank‑changing regime at your school?

On the Cessnas, we select BOTH unless the tanks become uneven, which makes life easy. It depends on what you’re doing, but generally you change regularly to keep things balanced — just not at low level.

Yes — fuel pump on, change tank, fuel pump off, then check that fuel pressure remains stable. Many people simply switch tanks without using the electric pump, but you should turn it on, change tanks, turn it off, and confirm pressure. If pressure drops, turn the pump back on and consider switching back to the previous tank. And certainly don’t change tanks at low level or on descent into the circuit — do it at an appropriate time as part of your checks.

There are several questions coming in about mogas. We don’t have time to cover mogas in detail, but the BMAA and LAA websites have excellent guidance and technical information. Charlotte, do you use mogas in any of your permit types?

No, I don’t personally. Many people do, but it’s something that requires proper differences training. We’ve mainly been talking about avgas here, so if you’re going to use mogas, check all the details.

Yes — the LAA and BMAA websites have good technical leaflets. We’ll try to include links in the post‑event email. Vapour‑locking in mogas can be a significant issue in summer months, as many of you will know.

Right — let’s move on to loss of control. Here’s another poll to get you engaged.

Poll: In the event of a stall warning during climb‑out, what is the most appropriate pilot response? I’ll let people read the options — no tricks here. And remember, none of the polls record who selects what.

Yes — 95% selected “reduce the pitch angle to decrease angle of attack.” Exactly right. Most people clearly understand this, and many of you have attended our loss‑of‑control workshops. Keep this in mind as we move into the next case study.

Someone commented that it’s trickier for rotary pilots — and I’m sure some of our gyrocopter colleagues will also have different considerations.

Loss of control: we have two case studies here. Some of you may already know more about these, but let’s take a look.

…case studies here. Again, some of you may know more about these, but let’s have a look.

The first one is a Cirrus — Golf Romeo Golf Sierra Kilo. If you want to look it up, it’s a Cirrus. The pilot had 115 hours total time, 16 on type, and was practising circuits. His first two touch‑and‑goes were normal, but on the third, the aircraft bounced on touchdown.

Data from engine‑management systems and CCTV showed that power was briefly reduced, then full power was applied while full flap remained selected. The nose pitched up further, the aircraft rolled and yawed left, and continued turning until the bank exceeded 90 degrees. The wing was fully stalled for the final five seconds of flight, and the aircraft struck the ground approximately 40 metres from the runway.

The Cirrus CAPS parachute system did deploy, but only because the activation cable was damaged during the breakup sequence — not because it was intentionally activated. This was a go‑around with full power leading to loss of control very close to the runway.

The second accident is a SportStar — Golf Charlie Mike Golf Bravo. It departed Colston in marginal weather conditions. There are questions around weather forecasting and what the pilot knew, but CCTV showed visibility as low as 400–600 metres with low cloud.

After take‑off, the pilot flew multiple orbits, changed altitude repeatedly, and then tracked south toward Chesterfield. ADS‑B data shows the aircraft climbing and descending in IMC‑like conditions, effectively entering cloud. Witnesses saw the aircraft enter cloud, re‑emerge low, then climb steeply again — the pilot was clearly trying to regain VMC.

Over Chesterfield, the aircraft entered a series of descending spirals. Some descent rates exceeded 5,000 feet per minute, and the final descent exceeded 11,000 feet per minute in a steep right rotation. Tragically, it impacted an industrial estate.

So, another loss of control — but very different from the first accident. Let’s look at the points we can take from these. Phil, over to you.

Yes, two very different accidents, but some common themes. In the first one, it’s classic low speed, high angle of attack, and rapid application of power. I fly the Cirrus from time to time, and it has strong left‑turning tendencies when power is applied at low speed. With flaps out and a high pitch attitude, these forces are amplified, and significant right rudder is required.

The Cirrus training manual emphasises smooth application of power over four to five seconds, immediate right rudder to counter yaw, and pitching just above the horizon to stabilise before cleaning up to 50% flap.

In this incident, power was applied too rapidly, with insufficient rudder, and the pitch attitude remained too high with the stall warning active throughout. Even in advanced aircraft like the Cirrus, the basics still matter: look ahead, balance yaw with rudder, and select the correct nose attitude.

Recency was also an issue — the pilot had not flown for 54 days. This situation would have induced a strong startle effect and potentially led to over‑control …rotation. So being really defensive about our recency is important. Complacency and skill‑fade also play a role. We see this a lot in the airline industry. Cirrus aircraft, for example, engage the yaw damper above 200 feet, meaning that during normal flight you don’t really need to use the rudder.

If you fly an aircraft like this, it’s important to stay engaged with the aircraft — something we talk about a lot in the Airbus world. Even if the yaw damper means you don’t need to apply rudder, stay mentally connected to what the aircraft is doing so you don’t lose that motor skill.

So in the Cirrus accident: power was applied too rapidly, pitch attitude was too high, and no standard stall‑recovery actions were applied.

Moving to the SportStar: this was an experienced pilot, but with limited or no IMC experience. His NPPL syllabus didn’t require instrument flight, so he was vulnerable to loss of spatial awareness in cloud. The forecast included showers, embedded cloud, and low bases. Actual conditions at Colston showed a cloud base around 200 feet.

Once visual reference was lost, the aircraft’s pitch and bank inputs became unstable, consistent with loss of situational awareness. Groundspeed increased to 178 knots at one point, confirming spatial disorientation. Loss of control was primarily due to IMC entry and disorientation. Without instrument‑flight training, once disorientation occurs, it is unlikely to improve.

I’ve lost friends in these scenarios. Even if we are instrument‑rated, it’s a perishable skill. If we have a lovely VMC summer in 2026, it’s worth considering a currency flight or refresher training before going back into full IMC, depending on your experience.

There’s a question we’ll never know the answer to, but as a team we discussed it: was there somewhere this pilot felt he had to get to? Was there pressure? The old saying applies: “Better to arrive early, never to arrive late — rather than never arrive at all.” If the flight no longer looks sensible or safe, cancel or take the car.

Thanks, Phil. So, takeaways from these: both accidents highlight the importance of maintaining control and flying the aircraft. The Cirrus accident shows how quickly a go‑around can deteriorate when pitch, yaw, and power are not managed together. A full‑flap go‑around requires precise control: smooth power application, pitch just above the horizon, and appropriate rudder — in this case, right rudder — to counter yaw. Avoid over‑rotation, accelerate, and use trim to help manage the aircraft.

Recognise the signs of an approaching stall: nose‑high pitch, decreasing airspeed, aerodynamic buffet, and stall warning if fitted. Maintaining recency is essential — skill‑fade affects decision‑making and motor response.

The SportStar accident reinforces several key safety principles. VFR minima are limits, not targets. Safe flight requires better conditions. If visibility is less than 5 km or the cloud base is below 1,500 feet, pilots should treat conditions as potentially unsafe for VFR.

In IMC, we cannot rely on vestibular cues. IMC entry becomes deadly very quickly for pilots not qualified for instrument flight. The recommended escape manoeuvre is an immediate 180‑degree turn. If in doubt, do not launch. Delaying departure would likely have prevented this accident.

VFR flight into IMC remains one of the most lethal accident categories. Strict personal minima and weather discipline are critical

Thanks, Charlotte. I’m just going to put something in the chat and read it out as well. A lot of people miss this point: if you look at the Single‑Engine Piston class‑rating test — the SRG 1157 form — one of the stalls in the test schedule is an approach stall in a climbing turn with take‑off flap and climb power.

What that’s referring to is a mishandled go‑around. It’s not one of the three stalls on the PPL or NPPL skills tests, but it is on the class‑rating test. It can be selected by examiners because it’s part of the class‑rating schedule on the SRG 2128.

Very few examiners actually choose it. Most PPL skills tests cover the three standard stalls, but this one can be used as an elective. It’s worth being aware of it.

Charlotte, do you cover mishandled go‑arounds in your training? Is it something you teach your students?

We make sure to cover it. It’s useful, especially at the revision stage heading toward the skills test — those additional scenarios are really valuable.

Yes, and we really encourage people — as we’ve said in previous webinars — to bring scenario‑based stall/spin awareness into training. Rather than treating stalls as an academic exercise for the skills test, link them to real‑world scenarios pilots will encounter in everyday flying.

Right. Those are the three themes we’ve covered. We now have five quiz questions to round things up — just to reinforce a few points and highlight themes from accident reports and our discussions with the CAA. Again, we don’t record who answers what.

First question: During approach, with two qualified pilots on board, which action best reduces the risk of loss of control?

Options included:

• Allow the most experienced pilot to fly

• Verbal transfer of control

• Handling pilot remains in control unless uncomfortable

These questions are written deliberately to make you think about the nuances. Let’s see what people chose.

89% selected: Clear verbal transfer of control; handling pilot familiar with the seat and control layout. That’s exactly what we were looking for. Clear, explicit “You have control / I have control” calls and seat‑specific familiarity are critical, especially close to the ground.

If you’re wondering where this comes from, there was a recent Grob 109 TMG accident report where there was confusion about who was pilot‑in‑command and who was actually flying. The person performing the landing was also unfamiliar with the controls from that seat. It does happen — it’s a real trap.

Phil, have you ever had any handover/takeover‑of‑control dramas in your career?

Yes — a couple, usually in very high‑workload situations. I think the most memorable were on the Hawk, where there were moments when neither person was actually flying the aircraft, or each thought the other was. And in the debrief when we looked into exactly what happened, it came down to those first few words: ensuring a clear, verbal transfer of control — not assuming the other person is flying. Thankfully, not too many incidents, but a few do spring to mind.

I had one in a glider. The instructor in the back said, “What are you doing, Matt?” and I said, “I’m not doing anything — you’re flying, aren’t you?” She thought I was flying, and I thought she was. Exactly that — no clear handover. Luckily, the aircraft was only gently turning, but close to the ground it could have been very serious.

Right, question two of five. Let’s have this one, please.

Some people are commenting that if you can’t see the other person — tandem seating in gliders or other aircraft — verbal handover becomes even more important.

Which statement best reflects the pilot‑in‑command’s responsibility when allowing another pilot to fly the aircraft?

I’ll let you read the answers. You can see where this is going. Again, this relates to the Grob 109B accident report if you want a case study.

Hopefully people have had time to read it. Let’s look at the answers.

92% selected: Pilot‑in‑command remains responsible. Exactly right. Even if someone else is flying, the PIC remains responsible and must manage risk proactively — including limiting who flies during critical phases of flight.

In some accident reports, pilots have allowed others to fly during take‑off or landing, and things have gone wrong for exactly these reasons.

Right, question three. Let’s have this one, please.

Why can water contamination in a carburetted aircraft cause a sudden loss of engine power after take‑off?

 Let’s look at the answers.

85% selected the correct option: water can enter the carburettor float bowl and be drawn into the main nozzle. It’s not about the induction system — it’s about the fuel/air mixture. If the engine ingests water instead of fuel, it simply cannot run.

And I think this is question number five in our quiz. Let’s have this one, please.

When power is applied during a go‑around at low airspeed and high nose attitude — like in the Cirrus accident — what is the likely aerodynamic effect?

Before anyone jumps in: assume a typical American Lycoming‑type engine — not a Chipmunk — so think Cessna 172, PA‑28, that sort of aircraft.

Clockwise‑rotating prop.

Let’s look at the answers.

90% got it right: yaw and roll to the left. Exactly. But again, it comes down to knowing your aircraft and understanding its aerodynamic tendencies.

Charlotte, you’ve got one very beautiful permit aircraft and one very beautiful soon‑to‑arrive aircraft in your fleet your aircraft. What do they do in terms of prop effects and yaw? Is it noticeable?

Not so much on the Chief — not a huge amount of power — but yes, my students are very used to hearing me say “rudder” a lot. It’s about getting used to taking your right foot forward when your right hand goes forward, in most of the aircraft we teach on. It’s about balancing and expecting the yaw, being ready for it.

And what about the Gemini — is that contra‑rotating or both the same?

No, it’s not contra‑rotating. I haven’t flown it yet, so I’ll get to grips with that soon. Two engines obviously means twice as much going on.

Charlotte is restoring a beautiful Miles Gemini — speaking slightly out of school — so look out for that in the circuit. It’ll be great to see it around.

Right, we’ve got a few questions, and we’ll pick them up before we wrap up. Oh — there is one more quiz question. I didn’t count very well earlier.

Hopefully you’ll recognise the theme from what we discussed earlier. What is the significant risk of using an autopilot that’s placarded unserviceable, even if some functions appear to work?

Have a look at the answers. You’ve got an autopilot that’s placarded unserviceable, but some parts seem to work. This is very common — I’ve seen it many times in aircraft I’ve tested or flown. Pilots often say, “It sort of works a bit.”

Let’s see what people chose.

The majority selected the correct answer: underlying defects, excessive clutch override, or other hidden faults can unmask an unrecoverable pitch‑trim or control issue. That’s exactly what we were looking for. Remember the N‑reg accident at Leeds East — the autopilot had various faults and contributed to the trim‑runaway scenario.

Right, a few more questions. Nigel commented that it’s not just about who has control, but ensuring the autopilot is properly engaged before assuming anything. Phil, autopilot modes are important for handovers, aren’t they?

Yes — if you’re going to use an autopilot, you must know exactly why you’re engaging it and ensure the correct modes have actually engaged. During a handover of control, if the autopilot is on, you must confirm the modes and ensure the pilot taking control understands them. It’s critically important.

And Charlotte — fuel samples from bowsers. Is that something you deal with at your school? How often do you check them? At the schools I’m involved with, it’s a daily sample from bowsers or tanks.

Yes, they’re checked every morning. It’s one of the jobs the team does before we start flying for the day making sure that what’s being dispensed is good fuel. Lots of comments again on avgas and mogas. We’ve put a few links in, and we’ll send them out with the post‑event email as well. The LAA, BMAA, and I believe the BGA all have good guidance on the use of mogas.

What I would say is that using mogas is not straightforward. There are many nuances — issues with ethanol content, and the variability of what you get from a fuel station. Additives and purity can vary significantly. It’s not something to take lightly; you really need to understand what you’re doing. There is excellent guidance available, but it’s more technical than we can cover tonight.

We’re at the hour mark, so we’re nicely on time. Thank you for everyone’s engagement, and thank you for joining us — especially on this dark, wet, miserable night here in West Oxfordshire.

Those are some of our social links, our website, and our contact details. When we finish tonight, a survey will pop up. Please take the time to fill it out. Again, we don’t record who says what or report anything to the CAA. Your feedback is valuable because it shapes the events and webinars we run. For example, the medical session, the weather session, GNSS, partial power — all came from your feedback.

 SkyWise is shown on the right. There’s been a lot of information coming out from the CAA recently. Please sign up so you get the email notifications — it’s a very valuable source of information.

That’s all from us. Thank you to Sophie in the background for managing the tech — sorry the chat didn’t start straight away, but she pressed the right buttons and got it working again. Zoom updates can disable things, so I’m glad she resolved it.

Phil and Charlotte, thanks so much for joining us. I know you’re both really busy. Phil, you’ve been working hard — you’re probably off for a sleep now.

Absolute pleasure — thanks for having me. And yes, sleep would be good.

Brilliant. And Charlotte, thanks. If you see us around the airfields or at events, do come and say hello. It’s always nice to chat face‑to‑face. We love seeing you out and about, and hopefully we’ll get some good weather soon so you can all get flying again.

Thanks for everyone’s engagement. There are some familiar names popping up, which is great to see. Our contact email is there as well — feel free to drop us a message with thoughts or issues. We get a lot of emails, but we do try to respond quickly and provide feedback where we can. It’s always great to hear from you.

Thanks very much, everyone. Take care, and good luck to you all.