



**Safety
Notice**

Civil Aviation Authority
SAFETY NOTICE
Number: SN-2021/017



Version 5 Issued: 3 September 2026

Version 5 is published to reflect the current airworthiness directive references and the status of third-party state safety information. It has also been updated to highlight the specific association to higher powered public mobile networks in the 3.4-3.6GHz band.

Potential Risk of Interference to Radio Altimeters from Public 5G Mobile Networks

This Safety Notice contains recommendations regarding operational safety.

Recipients must ensure that this Notice is copied to all members of their staff who need to take appropriate action or who may have an interest in the information (including any 'in-house' or contracted maintenance organisations and relevant outside contractors).

Applicability:	
Aerodromes:	Certified/licensed aerodromes
Air Traffic:	Air traffic service providers
Airspace:	Not primarily affected
Airworthiness:	All UK CAA approved organisations
Flight Operations:	All CAA approved or declared organisations and operators, including general aviation
Licensed/Unlicensed Personnel:	ATCO and Pilots

1 Introduction

- 1.1 The purpose of this Safety Notice (SN) is to provide information and guidance for operators regarding potential interference to the operation of radio altimeters from high powered public Fifth Generation (5G) mobile communications technology. This SN has been revised to focus on the interference risk overseas and to clarify the required actions when flying in areas where restrictions may be in place.

2 Background

- 2.1 Radio altimeters support a range of functions on board an aircraft and provide critical data for the safe execution of aircraft operations. Globally, the roll out of 5G telecommunications networks continues to expand, with many nations electing to allocate frequency bands that are located closer to the aerospace reserved band used by radio altimeters. Consequently, concerns have been raised by several national aviation authorities ("NAAs") that radio altimeters may be prone to interference from 5G telecommunications frequencies that could result in loss or malfunction of radio altimeter functionality.

- 2.2 The deployment of 5G mobile technology varies by state and is individually managed by state radio regulators. Deployment of 5G mobile technology is across a range of different frequency bands, output powers and other technical variables including in some cases geographical restrictions, which dictate the operating environment that radio altimeters will be required to function in. In the United Kingdom (UK), 5G public mobile broadband networks are being rolled out in multiple bands including the 3.6-4.2GHz frequency band.

In the UK the radio regulator Ofcom has made spectrum available for private mobile networks through Shared Access and Local Access licensing arrangements. Key spectrum bands available for private 5G deployments include 1800 MHz, 2300 MHz, 3.8-4.2 GHz and 24.25-27.5 GHz. This SN is not intended to cover these allocations.

Although the CAA has no jurisdiction over radio spectrum management and the allocation of spectrum, it does have a responsibility for aviation safety in the UK. Some countries have introduced temporary technical, regulatory or operational limitations on mobile telecommunications providers and/or the aviation industry to reduce the potential risk of interference.

- 2.3 The UK CAA continues to work closely with other NAAs to evaluate threats associated with the various national 5G roll out plans, noting that different national mobile telecommunication strategies may mean that some states have a higher threat exposure than others. Airframe and equipment manufacturers have also been requested to supply any relevant data they may have regarding system resilience to potential 5G interference.
- 2.4 Depending on specific aircraft architecture, the radio altimeter is an information source for a range of avionic systems, including (but not limited to) autoland capability, terrain awareness and ground proximity warning system ("GPWS") functions, airborne collision avoidance system ("ACAS") modes, flight control laws and autoflight protections. Threat modelling being conducted by aircraft manufacturers has looked at worst case interference levels resulting in complete loss, erroneous signals or potential display disagreements (where more than one radio altimeter is fitted). The susceptibility of aircraft to such interference is dependent on the aircraft type and avionics systems fitted.

3 Operations in the USA, Canada and Brazil

- 3.1 Where a state, based on its own safety analysis of its 5G roll out, has issued a Notice to Air Missions (NOTAM) or similar operational directive, UK operators are required to adhere to any state operational restrictions. The absence of such directives does not necessarily imply that interference will not be encountered.
- 3.2 Flight crew and those involved in operational control/despatch should be able to identify the Airworthiness Directive (AD) status of each aircraft in their fleet and the relevance of any applicable Means of Compliance (MOC) to ensure correct operational restrictions are applied (if required) for the route of flight. For clarity, this includes flights to airports of, through the airspace of, or when using en-route alternates belonging to, a state that has issued 5G related NOTAMs or similar operational or airworthiness directives.
- 3.3 The UK CAA acknowledges the Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA's), Transport Canada's and Brazil's National Civil Aviation Authority's (ANAC) assessment of the increased risk specific to the United States, Canada and Brazil due to 5G telecommunications having an increased spectrum usage footprint which can be operated closer to the radio altimeter frequency and with higher ground station power emissions.
- 3.4 As such the FAA has published AD 2023-10-02, Transport Canada AD CF-2024-14 and ANAC AD No: 2024-04-01 which is applicable to all Transport and Commuter category aeroplanes and

are based on a scenario where the safety risk associated with 5G/radio altimeter interference that is considered to affect the whole of contiguous USA, Canada and Brazil.

- 3.5 Although the AD's identified above were not formally adopted by the UK, UK operators who operate into third party states should be aware of any relevant AD's and must adhere to any information promulgated by the NAAs or their national Air Traffic Management services (e.g. through NOTAMs, Aeronautical Information Publication, Domestic Notices etc).
- 3.6 It is recommended that UK operators pay particular attention to any information promulgated by affected NAAs prohibiting certain instrument approach procedures depending on whether their aircraft radio altimeter cannot be demonstrated to meet the required radio altimeter power spectral density tolerant requirements. Any such restrictions would affect the approach and landing capability for operations in 5G affected airspace.

4 Action to be Taken

- 4.1 Operators should ensure their flight crew are aware of the possible implications of radio altimeter malfunctions for the types of aircraft operated; this may be particularly relevant when conducting Low Visibility Operations.
- 4.2 Flight crew experiencing radio altimeter or autoflight malfunctions should not assume that this has been caused by 5G interference and should follow normal operating procedures for any malfunctions or failures. Although flight crew should be aware of the possibility of 5G interference, any malfunctions observed may well be caused by other factors such as radio altimeter and associated antenna technical failures.
- 4.3 Any flight crew observations of radio altimeter or autoflight malfunction should be reported using normal company safety reporting procedures. Flight crew should include as much detail regarding the type of malfunction, including duration and location (particularly if during an approach or departure phase), the runway in use and the height above the ground that the malfunction was observed. If the commander assesses that the malfunction resulted in a significant risk to aviation safety the report should be submitted as a mandatory occurrence report, in accordance with the requirements of UK Reg (EU) No 376/2014.
- 4.4 Aerodromes should be cognisant of the potential risk of interference and associated trends that may emerge which could indicate issues relating to 5G interference.
- 4.5 Operators are responsible for ensuring compliance with UK Reg (EU) No 965/2012 (CAT.GEN.MPA.140) regarding the use of portable electronic devices on board an aircraft. This includes adherence to operator safety measures, including the deactivation of the transmitting capability by activating the so-called 'flight mode' or 'flight safety mode' on mobile devices.
- 4.6 Operators should have processes to capture and evaluate applicable safety information. This should include other state of registry or design safety information bulletins (or equivalent) for their aircraft fleet. The UK CAA does not automatically replicate relevant safety publications, which should be assessed on a case-by-case basis.

5 Further Information

- 5.1 The CAA will continue to work internationally to gather additional data to develop its position on this issue and will continue to monitor reporting trends. The CAA also remains engaged with the radio regulator, Ofcom, to remain abreast of the UK roll out in the band of interest.

6 Queries

- 6.1 Any queries or requests for further guidance as a result of this communication should be addressed via the organisation's operations inspector or airworthiness surveyor.

7 Cancellation

- 7.1 This Safety Notice will remain in force until further notice.