Safety Regulation Group
Safety Data

Follow-up Action on Occurrence Report

ACCIDENT TO BOEING 747-436, G-BNLL, AT OR TAMBO INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT, JOHANNESBURG, SOUTH AFRICA, ON 22 DECEMBER 2013

CAA FACTOR NUMBER	:	F4/2015
FACTOR PUBLICATION DATE	:	23 September 2015
TYPE OF FLIGHT	:	Commercial Air Transport
CAA OCCURRENCE NUMBER	:	201316680
SA CAA REPORT REFERENCE	:	CA18/2/3/9257

SYNOPSIS
From the South African CAA Report

The aircraft was going to embark on a commercial international air transportation long haul flight from FAOR to EGLL. The ATC gave the crew instructions to push back, start and face south, then taxi using taxiway Bravo to the Category 2 holding point for Runway 03L. During the taxi, instead of turning to the left to follow Bravo, the crew continued straight ahead, crossing the intersection of taxiway Bravo and aircraft stand taxilane Mike. After crossing the intersection, still being on Mike, the aircraft collided with a building. An investigation was conducted and several causal factors were determined. Amongst others, it was determined that the crew erred in thinking they were still taxiing on Bravo while in fact they were taxiing on Mike. This mistake, coupled with other contributory factors such as the briefing information, taxi information, ground movement visual aids, confusion and loss of situational awareness led to the collision.

Ten Safety Recommendations were made. Two are addressed to the UK CAA and are reproduced below.

FOLLOW UP ACTION

Recommendation 4.1

It is recommended that the UK Civil Aviation Authority enter into consultations with the operator about the crew's non-adherence to applicable briefing and taxi policies, procedures and requirements. The UK CAA to communicate to AAID what the appropriate corrective action will be to prevent recurrence.

CAA Response

The CAA accepts this recommendation and has entered into consultation with British Airways (BA) about the subjects specified. The UK CAA communicates to the AAID that, having noted the primary contributory factor of a failure to carry out an effective briefing identifying potential hazards after the taxi route was changed, a new training package, including simulator exercises, was designed and delivered to all BA crews.

This publication provides the initial response to each Safety Recommendation made by the Air Accidents Investigation Branch, Department of Transport Status 'CLOSED' or 'OPEN' indicates completion or not of all actions judged appropriate by the CAA in response to the Recommendation. It is published by the Safety Data, Safety Regulation Group, Civil Aviation Authority, Aviation House, Gatwick Airport South, West Sussex, RH6 0YR. Tel: 01293 573220 Fax: 01293 573972 Email: sdd@caa.co.uk

The current status and the final responses to all safety recommendations are contained in an annual AAIB report titled ACCIDENTS INVESTIGATION BRANCH (AAIB) SAFETY RECOMMENDATIONS AND RESPONSES.

The package, designed by the Human Factors Standards Group (HSFG) in conjunction with fleet Training Standards Captains (TSCs) from a variety of BA fleets, consists of a non type-specific human factors briefing that discusses decision-making and change identification. This is followed by Full Flight Simulator exercises to put into practice the human factors briefing. The briefing, which takes approximately 10 minutes to complete, encourages crews to associate change with new threats, but also discusses the various levels of Situational Awareness in language which crew understand and are used to, i.e., 'Notice', 'Understand' and 'Think Ahead'.

The training brief also discusses the inadvisability of trying to brief every eventuality as this can mask change. Instead, crews are advised to brief the most likely occurrence and to re-brief when change has been identified. That re-briefing could be a simple update of a minor operational change or a thorough briefing. The training package emphasises that crews should allocate sufficient time for the re-briefing, and if that requires a ground or air hold to build in that time, this should be requested.

The practical simulator exercise occurs on the training day of a two day simulator recurrent check/refresher. During the normal course of the simulator session the instructor will introduce changes from the briefed profile. Three or four instances of change will be introduced, ranging from the relatively trivial through to change which will require a thorough re-briefing and, importantly, a re-identification of threats. The change will be designed so that the nature of the threat has changed. An example is an arrival into Geneva, where the Standard Instrument Arrival changes. Beyond the obvious changes associated with the different route to be flown, the very significant threat posed by the significant changes of Sector Safety Altitude (SSA) must be identified, when pilots could otherwise be primarily focussed on the re-programming of the aircraft's Flight Management Computers (FMCs).

CAA Status – Closed

Recommendation 4.3

It is recommended that the UK CAA look into or address the matter of the revision status of the aeronautical data issued by the third party service provider referencing the issues raised of Navtech. It should be noted that the South African AIP is a legal document prepared in accordance with the Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPs) of ICAO Annex 15 of which the charts contained in it are produced in accordance with ICAO Annex 4. Its purpose is to provide appropriate safety information (i.e. aeronautical data) to the aviation industry; therefore operators are to ensure that the aeronautical data they use, irrespective of the source, complies with the information published in the South African AIP.

CAA Response

The UK CAA accepts this recommendation and has, in conjunction with British Airways, looked into the revision status of the aeronautical data issued by the third party service provider. This was realised through the design and implementation by BA of an audit process that included an in-depth assessment of the chart supplier's quality assurance system.

As a consequence of this, British Airways has changed their chart supplier. This process has been incorporated into an audit schedule, which is being applied to new chart providers. As a further quality check, crews are required to report a charting discrepancy, should they notice it. In light of these measures, the UK CAA is satisfied that the aeronautical data used by BA will comply with the information published in the South African AIP.

CAA Status – Closed