

Follow-up Action on Occurrence Report

SERIOUS INCIDENT TO SOCATA TBM850, N850TV, AT BIRMINGHAM AIRPORT ON 12 JANUARY 2011

CAA FACTOR NUMBER	:	F5/2011
FACTOR PUBLICATION DATE	:	23 December 2011
NATURE OF FLIGHT	:	Private
CAA OCCURRENCE NUMBER	:	2011/00323
AAIB REPORT	:	Bulletin 10/2011

SYNOPSIS

From AAIB Report

Following a loss of communications on approach due to a frequency mis-selection by the pilot, the TBM 850 passed over the top of an aircraft holding on the Birmingham Airport Runway 15 starter extension and landed. No injuries or damage occurred.

FOLLOW UP ACTION

Recommendation 2011-073

It is recommended that the Civil Aviation Authority resolve the conflicting expectations of flight crews and air traffic controllers following a loss of communications during approach.

CAA Response

The CAA accepts this recommendation. The CAA will review and publish revised requirements to support the national elements of the Loss of Communications procedures. This action will be completed by 30 April 2012. Following the publication of the revised Loss of Communication procedures, the CAA will issue appropriate instructions and guidance to ensure both flight crews and air traffic controllers use the same expectations in their planning following a loss of communications during approach. This action will be completed by 31 August 2012.

CAA Status - Open

Recommendation 2011-074

It is recommended that the Civil Aviation Authority review the risk assessment of the hazards associated with clearing aircraft to line up ahead of landing traffic.

CAA Response

The CAA accepts this recommendation insofar as it is the responsibility of Air Navigation Service Providers to undertake adequate risk assessment of the hazards associated with clearing aircraft to line up ahead of landing traffic. The CAA will ensure that, commensurate with the action taken in response to Safety Recommendation 2011-073, Air Navigation Service Providers' operational procedures and associated safety assurance, provide effective mitigation of any relevant hazard relating to the clearing of aircraft to line up ahead of landing traffic which will achieve the intent of the

The current status and the final responses to all safety recommendations are contained in an annual AAIB report titled ACCIDENTS INVESTIGATION BRANCH (AAIB) SAFETY RECOMMENDATIONS AND RESPONSES.

This publication provides the initial response to each Safety Recommendation made by the Air Accidents Investigation Branch, Department of Transport Status 'CLOSED' or 'OPEN' indicates completion or not of all actions judged appropriate by the CAA in response to the Recommendation. It is published by the Safety Data, Safety Regulation Group, Civil Aviation Authority, Aviation House, Gatwick Airport South, West Sussex, RH6 0YR. Tel: 01293 573220 Fax: 01293 573972 Email: sdd@caa.co.uk

Safety Recommendation. This action, which is dependent on the completion of the CAA's action in response to Safety Recommendation 2011-073 (because the National Radio Failure and Lost Communications procedures provide the policy on which the relevant operational procedures are based), will be completed by 30 October 2012.

CAA Status - Open

Recommendation 2011-075

It is recommended that NATS review the content of the Birmingham Airport Automated Terminal Information System to ensure that it is clear and concise, and includes the type of approach to be expected.

CAA Response

This Recommendation is not addressed to the CAA.

CAA Status - Closed

Recommendation 2011-076

It is recommended that the Civil Aviation Authority review the most appropriate means of providing the visual instructions for which pilots are required to maintain a watch in accordance with Rule 45(6)(b) of the UK Air Navigation Order.

CAA Response

The CAA accepts this recommendation and will review and, if required, publish revised national safety regulatory requirements on visual instructions to pilots or drivers to determine whether they promote the most effective way to address the risk of loss of R/T communication with pilots and drivers. The CAA will use the conclusions of the review to influence appropriately, International requirements such as ICAO SARPS, the SERA and EASA Regulations. The CAA will require those ATC units that do not currently have visual signalling devices to conduct, document and submit to the CAA a safety assessment on how the hazards associated with the loss of RT communication with pilots or drivers are mitigated effectively. An update report on progress will be provided by September 2012.

CAA Status - Open