Safety Regulation Group Safety Information and Data Department



Follow-up Action on Occurrence Report

ACCIDENT TO HAWKER SIDDELEY HS 748 SERIES 2A, G-BVOV, AT GUERNSEY AIRPORT ON 8 MARCH 2006

(Overrun on landing)

CAA FACTOR NUMBER : F10/2008

FACTOR PUBLICATION DATE : 21 August 2008

OPERATOR : Emerald Airways Limited

CAA OCCURRENCE NUMBER : 2006/01811

AAIB REPORT : AAR 6/2008

SYNOPSIS

From AAIB Report:

The aircraft was landing at Guernsey at the end of a two-sector cargo service from Coventry and Jersey. The Category I ILS approach on Runway 27 at Guernsey was flown in weather conditions that were poor but acceptable for making the approach and there was ample fuel on board for a diversion. The aircraft was seen to touch down between 400 and 550 metres from the 'stop' end of the runway and overran by some 145 metres onto the grass beyond the paved surface. There were no injuries.

Investigations by the AAIB revealed no aircraft or runway deficiencies to account for the overrun. During the final approach and landing there were substantial divergences from the company Operations Manual.

This operator had previously been the subject of close monitoring by the CAA over a sustained period and its Air Operator's Certificate (AOC) was later suspended.

The investigation identified the following casual factors:

- (i) The flight crew did not comply with the Standard Operating Procedures for a Category I ILS.
- (ii) The commander's decision to land or go around was delayed significantly beyond the intersection of the Decision Altitude and the ILS glideslope.
- (iii) After landing, the crew did not immediately apply maximum braking or withdraw the flight fine pitch stops, as advised in the Operations Manual.
- (iv) The operator's training staff lacked knowledge of the Standard Operating Procedures.

The investigation identified the following contributory factor:

(i) Close monitoring by the CAA had not revealed the depth of the lack of knowledge of Standard Operating Procedures within the operator's flight operations department until after this incident.

One Safety Recommendation is made to the CAA.

FOLLOW UP ACTION

The one Safety Recommendation made by the AAIB following their investigation is reproduced below together with the CAA's response.

Recommendation 2008-026

It is recommended that the Civil Aviation Authority implement a more robust process of graduated measures for addressing identified safety-related shortcomings in an AOC Holder's operations, within an appropriate timescale, to ensure that the AOC Holder meets and maintains the required standard.

CAA Response

The CAA accepts this Recommendation and has modified its system in order to produce a more robust process of graduated measures for addressing identified safety-related shortcomings in AOC holders' operations, within an appropriate timescale, and so ensure that the AOC Holder meets and maintains the required standard.

Should an AOC Holder have an identified significant non-compliance or non-compliances which lowers safety to the point where there is a serious hazard to flight safety, the CAA normally takes regulatory action such as the suspension of an approval or the prevention of an aircraft from flying.

However, should an AOC Holder's safety management performance, though above minimum acceptable levels, show a trend which, unless corrected, would soon result in unacceptable safety levels, then the CAA's newly introduced "On Notice" procedure is applied. The operator is advised that it is "On Notice" and that unless action is taken in accordance with a plan acceptable to the CAA, further regulatory action will be taken such as the suspension of approvals related to identified non-conformities, or, in some cases, the suspension of the AOC.

These measures have already been used effectively on several occasions. The CAA believes that these measures, together with the existing oversight system, provides the graduated system needed to ensure that operators maintain the required standards.

CAA Status - Closed