

# Follow-up Action on Occurrence Report

ACCIDENT TO BOEING B777-200ER, AP-BGL, AT MANCHESTER INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT ON 1 MARCH 2005

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AAIB REPORT	:	Bulletin 1/2006

# SYNOPSIS

(From AAIB Report)

Whilst the aircraft was taxiing, following an otherwise uneventful landing at Manchester, flames were seen around the wheels of the left main landing gear. As the airport Rescue and Fire Fighting Service WFS) attempted to extinguish the flames, copious quantities of what the REFS Watch Commander assessed as smoke were produced and, fearing that the fire was getting out of control, he advised the aircraft commander to evacuate the aircraft. Minor injuries were sustained by some passengers and several fire service personnel during the evacuation. The investigation determined that the cause of the fire, established as being in the No 10 main landing gear wheel, most likely resulted from the maintenance practice used when cleaning the wheel heat shields. It was likely that these had been immersed in a flammable solvent, which allowed the ceramic fibre insulation material contained within to become contaminated. The fire occurred on the second landing after the wheel had been fitted to the aircraft, when the brake pack temperature was likely to have been higher than on the previous landing.

# FOLLOW UP ACTION

The four Safety Recommendations, made by the AAIB following their investigation, are reproduced overleaf / below, together with the CAA's responses.

# **Recommendation 2005-092**

The Civil Aviation Authority should require at aerodromes, where the Rescue and Fire Fighting Category is 3 and above, or where an air traffic control service is provided, that a radio frequency to facilitate direct communications between an aircraft and the Airport Rescue and Fire Fighting Service, in the event of an accident or incident to an aircraft on the airfield, is made available and appropriately promulgated.

This publication provides the initial CAA response to each Safety Recommendation made by the Air Accidents Investigation Branch, Department of Transport. Status 'CLOSED' or 'OPEN' indicates completion or not of all actions judged appropriate by the CAA in response to the Recommendation. It is published by the Safety Investigation and Data Department, Safety Regulation Group, Civil Aviation Authority, Aviation House, Catwick Airport South, West Sussex, RH6 0YR. Tel: 01293 573220 Fax: 01293 573972 Telex: 878753.

The current status and the final responses to all Safety Recommendations are contained in an annual AAIB report entitled AIR ACCIDENTS INVESTIGATION BRANCH (AAIB) SAFETY RECOMMENDATIONS AND RESPONSES.

#### **CAA Response**

The CAA accepts this recommendation. CAP 168 will be amended to require, at all aerodromes where the RFF category is 3 and above, or where an air traffic control service is provided, a radio frequency to facilitate direct communications between an aircraft and the Airport Fire Service. This will be completed by September 2006. The radio frequency will, when operational, be promulgated in the UK AIP.

#### CAA Status - Open

#### **Recommendation 2005-093**

The Civil Aviation Authority should require that any radio communication frequency used to facilitate direct communications between an aircraft and the Airport Rescue and Fire Fighting Service, in the event of an accident or incident on the airfield, should be recorded, in order that it may be reproduced to assist in accident and incident investigation.

#### **CAA Response**

The CAA accepts this recommendation. CAP 168 will be amended to require the recording of all direct radio communications between an aircraft and the Airport Fire Service in order that it may be reproduced to assist in accident and incident investigation. This will be completed by September 2006.

CAA Status - Open

### Recommendation 2005-097

It is recommended that Pakistan International Airline Corporation review the training given to their cabin crews with the intention of ensuring that, in the event of an evacuation command being given by the aircraft commander, the evacuation is carried out as expeditiously as possible, irrespective of the lack of any threat to the aircraft perceived by the cabin crew.

#### CAA Response

This Recommendation is not addressed to the CAA.

**CAA Status - Closed** 

#### **Recommendation 2005-131**

It is recommended that the Civil Aviation Authority review the advice given in CAP 168 in regard to aerodrome procedures for leading passengers, evacuated from an aircraft, to secure areas away from the scene of the incident and ensure that the relevant Aerodrome\ Emergency orders suitably address this topic.

#### **CAA Response**

The CAA accepts this recommendation. The advice in CAP 168 will be reviewed and amended as necessary. This will be completed by September 2006. The CAA will also, as part of the regular aerodrome audit programme, ensure that relevant Aerodrome Emergency Orders suitability address this topic.

CAA Status - Open