

Follow-up Action on Occurrence Report

INCIDENT INVOLVING EMB 145EU, G-EMBL, AT BIRMINGHAM AIRPORT ON 18 NOVEMBER 2003 (MAIN LANDING GEAR TYRE SHRED ITS TREAD ON TAKEOFF)

CAA FACTOR NUMBER	:	F44/2004
FACTOR PUBLICATION DATE	:	13 October 2004
OPERATOR	:	BA CitiExpress
CAA OCCURRENCE NUMBER	:	2003/08028
AAIB REPORT	:	Bulletin 9/2004

SYNOPSIS

(From AAIB Report)

During takeoff at Birmingham, the left inboard main wheel tyre (number 2) shed its tread. The tread had failed as a result of overstress in the sidewall of the tyre, leading to a break up of the tyre casing plies. Air penetrated through the failure in the inner wall of the tyre and then permeated through the casing leading to the tread package lifting from the carcass. The overstress was attributed to the tyre running under-inflated, which may have been as a result of leakage from the wheel fuse plugs. Four safety recommendations regarding the maintenance of Embraer 145 wheels and tyres are made.

FOLLOW UP ACTION

The four Safety Recommendations, made by the AAIB following their investigation, are reproduced below, together with the CAA's responses.

Recommendation 2004-27

Goodrich Aircraft Wheels and Brakes Division should carry out research into the possible causes of the fuse plug leakage and consider action to reduce the risk of leaking fuse plugs.

CAA Response

This Recommendation is not addressed to the CAA.

CAA Status - Closed

Recommendation 2004-28

EMBRAER (Empresa Brasileira de Aeronautica SA) should amend the maintenance schedule for the EMB-145 and similar models, to require that:

- a. Tyre pressures are checked every 24 hours.
- b. The as-found and re-inflation tyre pressures are recorded in the technical log for monitoring purposes.

This publication provides the initial CAA response to each Safety Recommendation made by the Air Accidents Investigation Branch, Department of Transport. Status 'CLOSED' or 'OPEN' indicates completion or not of all actions judged appropriate by the CAA in response to the Recommendation.

The current status and the final responses to all Safety Recommendations are contained in an annual CAA report entitled PROGRESS REPORT - CAA RESPONSES TO AIR ACCIDENTS INVESTIGATION BRANCH (AAIB) SAFETY RECOMMENDATIONS. The absence of errors and omissions cannot be guaranteed. This document is published by the Safety Investigation and Data Department, Safety Regulation Group, Civil Aviation Authority, Aviation House, Gatwick Airport South, West Sussex, RH6 0YR. Tel: 01293 573220 Fax: 01293 573972 Telex: 878753

CAA Response

This Recommendation is not addressed to the CAA.

CAA Status - Closed

Recommendation 2004-29

The European Aviation Safety Agency should require all wheel repair stations conforming to JARs (Joint Airworthiness Requirements) to inform the tyre re-treader of the reason for removal of the tyre from the aircraft and indicate if there has been any suspicion of the tyre running under-inflated.

CAA Response

This Recommendation is not addressed to the CAA.

CAA Status - Closed

Recommendation 2004-30

The US Federal Aviation Administration should require all wheel repair stations conforming to FARs (Federal Airworthiness Requirements) to inform the tyre re-treader of the reason for removal of the tyre from the aircraft and indicate if there has been any suspicion of the tyre running under-inflated.

CAA Response

This Recommendation is not addressed to the CAA.

CAA Status - Closed