

**Guidance for the Completion of Safety Assurance Documentation**

To support the aerodromes in a smooth transition from their current Licence to a Certificate based on European rules, the CAA has indicated that a review of their variations or non-compliance with the proposed rules should be undertaken by the aerodromes prior to the transition date. The review is intended to ensure the aerodrome operator is aware of any potential issues that may arise during transition and allow those issues to be addressed and recorded appropriately.

The objective of this paper is to provide guidance on how Safety Assurance Documentation (SAD) should be developed in cases where evidence of any documentation is not available at transition.

Existing variations are shown on the CAA form 1560J and are subject to review at each audit. To comply with the new EASA regulation, those variations should be reallocated as either an Equivalent Level of Safety (ELOS), Special Condition (SC) or a Deviation Acceptance and Action Document (DAAD).

A number of the existing variations are so old that evidence of SAD may have been lost. Therefore, the transition activity is an opportunity to ensure the variations remain applicable under the new rules and if so, are supported by SAD. This is particularly relevant when the existing variation may be reallocated as either an ELOS or a SC, because, once accepted, these items form part of the Certification Basis (CB) and as such become the responsibility of the aerodrome operator and are only reviewed again when impacted by the change management requirements under the new regulation. Therefore, these variations could be long term and, as such, would not meet the SMS obligations of the aerodrome operator or the CAA for these deviations to be recorded without evidence of SAD.

The CAA is expecting that all SAD would be completed by the time the aerodrome is ready for transition. However, to facilitate the transition of those aerodromes that have not managed to produce SAD for all variations, including those that would normally meet the criteria for an ELOS or SC, the CAA would initially record those variations as a DAAD item with the action that SAD is developed within a timescale agreed by both parties. Therefore, development of the appropriate SAD could continue post transition.

In the rare circumstances of the variation being allocated, or reallocated, as an ELOS it would be expected that the SAD would be substantial enough to indicate how the variation is achieving the ‘equivalent’ level of safety. The remaining options for a variation, the SC or DAAD, would require SAD that indicates that the aerodrome operator has reviewed the variation, assessed its applicability, assessed the possible consequences resulting from the variation, and where appropriate, developed some mitigation depending on the level of risk identified. The assessment of the variation and level of mitigation provided should be conducted using the aerodrome’s current risk assessment methodology. An example risk assessment template is attached to show the type of information required.

The SAD should identify:

* What is the variation including a reference to the part or whole of the CS that cannot be met and why?
* What are the potential consequences of the variation?
* How is the risk associated with the variation currently managed?
* Is further mitigation required?

A final task should be for the variation safety assurance documentation to be recorded and reference to on the appropriate table contained within the CB or attached to the certificate (ELOS, SC or DAAD).

This process should also be applied to non-compliances identfied during the transition process.

SAD risk assessment template guidance:

[](http://www.caa.co.uk/default.aspx?catid=375&pageid=15909)

SAD risk assessment template:

[](http://www.caa.co.uk/default.aspx?catid=375&pageid=15910)