INTEGRITY AND CONTINUITY ANALYSIS FOR GPS

QUARTERLY REPORT 2 (APRIL TO JUNE 2024)

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Integrity and Continuity Analysis for GPS

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES AND FIGURES

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1. PURPOSE

This document presents the results of the integrity and continuity analysis for GPS against ICAO requirements for the period of April to June 2024. The results have been generated in the frame of the performance monitoring contract awarded to GMV NSL by the CAA. The objectives of the study are to compare the measured performance to applicable ICAO SARPs in Annex 10 Volume 1 [RD.1], covering the following parameters [AD.1]:

■ Accuracy;

■ Integrity;

■ Continuity;

■ Availability.

Assuming fault free receiver performance conforming to TSO-C129 specification.

The performance is analysed using raw data recorded at the GMV Nottingham site.

1.2. DOCUMENT OVERVIEW

This document is arranged in the following sections:

■ **Section 1**, the current section, is an introduction which describes the purpose, scope and structure of the document;

■ **Section 2** introduces the activity, including relevant performance requirements, methodology for assessment and list of assumptions;

■ **Section 3** presents the accuracy assessment;

■ **Section 4** contains an assessment of the integrity;

■ **Section 5** presents the continuity assessment;

■ **Section 6** contains an assessment of the availability;

■ **Section 7** presents the conclusions.

1.3. REFERENCES

1.3.1. APPLICABLE DOCUMENTS

The following documents, of the exact issue shown, form part of this document to the extent specified herein. Applicable documents are those referenced in the Contract or approved by the Approval Authority. They are referenced in this document in the form [AD.x]:

Table 1-1 Applicable Documents

Ref.	Title	Code	Version	Date
[AD.1]	THE PROVISION OF MONITORING AND ANALYSIS OF GPS SIGNALS IN SPACE –	CONTRACT NO. 1762 (AMENDMENT NO. 12)	-	21/02/24
[AD.2]				
[AD.3]				
[AD.4]				

1.3.2. REFERENCE DOCUMENTS

The following documents, although not part of this document, amplify or clarify its contents. Reference documents are those not applicable and referenced within this document. They are referenced in this document in the form [RD.x]:

Table 1-2 Reference Documents

Ref.	Title	Code	Version	Date
[RD.1]	ICAO SARPS, Annex 10: International Standards and Recommended Practices: Aeronautical Telecommunications, Volume 1: Radio Navigation Aids	-	7th Edition	July 2018
[RD.2]	Global Positioning System Standard Positioning Service Performance Standard	GPS SPS	5th Edition	April 2020
[RD.3]	Reference Set of Parameters for RAIM Availability Simulations', EUROCAE WG-62	-	-	8-9 July 2003
[RD.4]	The International GNSS Service in a changing landscape of Global Navigation Satellite Systems	Journal of Geodesy 83: 191-198		2009

1.4. ACRONYMS

Acronyms used in this document and needing a definition are included in the following table:

Table 1-3 Acronyms

Acronym	Definition
AOD	Age of Data
CAA	Civil Aviation Authority
GNSS	Global Navigation Satellite System
GPS	Global Positioning System
HDOP	Horizontal Dilution of Precision
IGS	International GNSS Service
NANU	Notice Advisory to Navstar Users
NOTAM	Notice To Airmen
PDOP	Position Dilution Of Precision
RAIM	Receiver Autonomous Integrity Monitoring
SIS	Signal In Space
SPS	Standard Positioning Service
TTA	Time To Alarm
UERE	User Equivalent Range Error
URA	User Range Accuracy
URE	User Range Error
VDOP	Vertical Dilution Of Precision

2. INTRODUCTION

2.1. PURPOSE

The purpose of the performance monitoring activity [AD.1] is to collect and analyse data on the performance of the GPS Signal In Space (SIS). For this report, the applicable requirements are defined in the ICAO SARPs (Standards and Recommended Practices) contained in Annex 10 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation, Volume 1 Radio Navigation Aids [RD.1].

2.2. ICAO STANDARDS AND DEFINITIONS

The ICAO Annex 10 Volume 1 Chapter 3 Section 3.7 details the ICAO SARPS for GNSS [RD.1]. Section 3.7.2.4.1 sets the Signal-in-Space (SiS) performance requirements. An important assumption made in this respect is that *"the combination of GNSS elements and a fault-free receiver shall meet the SiS requirements defined in Table 3.7.2.4- 1 (located at the end of section 3.7)"*. The table below presents the requirements specified for NPA together with a number of corresponding notes.

Horizontal Accuracy 95% (Notes 1 and 3)	Horizontal Alert Limit	Integrity	Time to Alert (Note 3)	Continuity (Note 4)	Availability (Note 5)
220m	556m	$1-1\times10^{-7}$/h	10 s	$1-1\times10^{-4}$/h to $1-1\times10^{-8}$/h	0.99 to 0.99999

Note 1 – The 95th percentile values for GNSS position errors are those required for the intended operation at the lowest height above threshold (HAT), if applicable.

Note 3 – The accuracy and time–to-alert requirements include the nominal performance of a fault free receiver.

Note 4 – Ranges of values are given for the continuity requirement for NPA operations, as this requirement is dependent upon several factors including the intended operation, traffic density, complexity of airspace and availability of alternative navigational aids. The lower value given is the minimum requirement for areas with low traffic density and airspace complexity.

Note 5 – A range of values is given for the availability requirement as these requirements are dependent upon the operational need which is based upon several factors including the frequency of operations, weather environments, the size and duration of outages, availability of alternative navigational aids, radar coverage, traffic density and reversionary operational procedures. The lower values given are the minimum availabilities for which a system is considered to be practical but are not adequate to replace non-GNSS navigation aids. For approach and departure, the higher values given are based upon the availability requirements at airports with a large amount of traffic assuming that operations to or from multiple runways are affected but reversionary operational procedures ensure the safety of the operation.

Some related definitions for the performance requirements are given below.

Horizontal Accuracy

Annex 10 Volume 1 Attachment D section 3.2.1 states: *"GNSS position error is the difference between the estimated position and the actual position. For an estimated position at a specific location, the probability should be at least 95 per cent that the position error is within the accuracy requirement."*

Integrity, Horizontal Alert Limit, Time to Alert

ICAO Annex 10 Volume 1 Attachment D section 3.3.1 states: "*Integrity is a measure of the trust that can be placed in the correctness of the information supplied by the total system. Integrity includes the ability of a system to provide timely and valid warnings to the user (alerts) when the system must not be used for the intended operation (or phase of flight)."* Therefore, integrity is the probability of not using a radiated false guidance signal.

For a loss of integrity to occur, the following conditions need to exist at the same time:

■ radiation from the satellite system of a signal, which would result in a derived position error outside the ICAO GNSS NPA Horizontal Alert Limit (HAL), and

■ failure to detect and indicate when the ICAO GNSS NPA HALs have been exceeded for a period of time beyond the ICAO GNSS NPA Time-To-Alert (TTA) period.

In this respect, the following points are relevant:

■ The GPS SPS [RD.2] incorporates monitoring of the health of the satellites. This monitoring is not at the required probability level nor is it sufficiently prompt to fulfil the ICAO GNSS Horizontal Accuracy and TTA requirements.

■ The use of at least a TSO-C129a compliant receiver will be necessary for GPS supported NPAs in accordance with AMC-20-XX. This type of receiver provides "Real-time monitoring" of the derived GPS position by the use of Receiver Autonomous Integrity Monitoring (RAIM).

■ The requirements for the integrity contribution of the receiver are specified in document RTCA DO-208 Table 2-1 "GPS Position Integrity Performance Requirements", which is referenced from document TSO-C129a. Table 2-1 sets a minimum detection probability at 0.999.

■ The ICAO requirement for integrity for GPS when used to provide a NPA is 1-(1x10-7) per flight hour.

■ Taking into account the receiver detection probability of 0.999 there remains an integrity requirement of 1 – (1 x 10-4) per flight hour to be achieved by the remaining parts of the system. These remaining parts include the performance of the SIS and any other real time monitoring devices in use.

Continuity

Annex 10 Attachment D section 3.4.1 states: "*Continuity of service of a system is the capability of the system to perform its function without unscheduled interruptions during the intended operation."* ICAO provides a range of values for continuity; the value used by a specific aerodrome will depend upon several factors including the intended operation, traffic density, complexity of airspace and availability of alternative navigational aids. Guidance on setting this requirement can be found in Annex 10 Volume 1 Attachment D section 3.4.2.3

It should be noted that the ICAO SARPs for NPA are consistent with those for en-route. In this respect, Annex 10 Volume 1 Attachment D section 3.4.2.1 states: "*For en-route operations, continuity of service relates to the capability of the navigation system to provide a navigation output with the specified accuracy and integrity throughout the intended operation, assuming that it was available at the start of the operation."*

Therefore, loss of continuity (strictly in the case of SiS, i.e. assuming a fault free receiver) can be considered to be when the horizontal alert limit cannot be achieved due to an unexpected failure of the GPS service for 10 Seconds or more, during a period when RAIM is predicted to be available for a specific approach.

Availability

ICAO Annex 10 Volume 1 Attachment D section 3.5.1 states: "*The availability of GNSS is characterized by the portion of time the system is to be used for navigation during which reliable navigation information is presented to the crew, autopilot, or other system managing the flight of the*

aircraft". Furthermore, Section 3.5.6 states: "The availability of GNSS should be determined through design, analysis and modelling, rather than measurement."

Under normal conditions, availability of the signal from sufficient satellites for the provision of RAIM, a prerequisite for the use of GPS in support of a NPA, is predictable and may be assessed in advance of the use of the instrument approach procedure.

2.3. METHODOLOGY

For the performance analysis in this report, raw GPS measurement data from reference stations has been analysed. The primary source of data is continuously operating receivers, installed by GMV at their Nottingham and Harwell offices, and that provide a log of 1Hz GNSS measurement data. These are shown in the map below.


Figure 2-1: Location of GMV Monitoring Receivers

As an alternative, data from the EUREF permanent GPS network can be used (as shown in the next figure). The EUREF receivers provide high rate (1Hz), multi-constellation, multi-frequency GNSS measurements. The data files are accessed via ftp and can be downloaded at GMV NSL before processing with GISMO SW. The daily navigation message files are also downloaded from the IGS ftp site and used to provide the navigation data [RD.4].

Figure 2-2: Location of EUREF Sites
(http://www.epncb.oma.be/_networkdata/stationmaps.php)

In this quarter, data from the GMV Nottingham site (NOTT) is used for the entire period.

2.4. ASSUMPTIONS

For processing the raw data and generating the results the following assumptions are made:

■ Single frequency (L1) processing with C/A code;

■ 5-degree elevation mask used;

■ Broadcast iono model (Klobuchar) used to remove ionospheric errors;

■ RTCA trop model used to remove tropospheric errors;

■ Weighted least squares RAIM algorithm used for RAIM prediction (protection level computation) and Fault Detection;

■ Probability of missed detection = 0.001 and Probability of false alarm = 1x10-5 for RAIM computations;

■ UERE budget (non-SIS components) used in position solution and for RAIM predictions based given below [RD.3]:

Elevation, degrees	Error, metres
5	7.48
10	6.64
15	5.92
20	5.31
30	4.31
40	3.57
50	3.06

Integrity and Continuity Analysis for GPS

Elevation, degrees	Error, metres
60	2.73
90	2.44

- The URA value from the broadcast navigation message is combined with the values in the table to form the total UERE for the observations.

As the actual monitoring is based on the measurements from one receiver, the following points should be noted:

- Performance monitoring is local to the monitoring station with a coverage area defined by the correlation of the major error sources and the configuration of the constellation.

- The range domain errors contain the residuals of other error sources other than the SIS range errors, hence the performance statistics generated are conservative.

3. ACCURACY

Accuracy is defined as the measure of the calculated position error between the position solution and the known location of the antenna at the 95th percentile. The position solution is computed at the receiver using the L1 GPS measurements at 1Hz rate above an elevation of 5 degrees. The horizontal and vertical error distributions for the period April to June 2024 are shown in the following figures for fault-free solutions (i.e. no problems indicated). The samples shown in each figure are in error bins of 1cm and include position errors from all days during the monitoring period.


Figure 3-1: Horizontal Error Distribution for Monitoring Period


Figure 3-2: Vertical Error Distribution for Monitoring Period

It can be seen that the horizontal errors are most commonly around 1 to 2m.

To better understand the maximum errors, details of the horizontal error distribution above 4m and vertical error distribution above 8m are also shown.


**Figure 3-3: Horizontal Error Distribution above 4m for Monitoring Period**

Figure 3-4: Vertical Error Distribution above 8m for Monitoring Period

It is clear from the results that the maximum horizontal errors are well below the accuracy requirement for Non-Precision Approach (220m, 95%). The daily 95% position errors are also shown to illustrate the fact that the daily performance is also well within the requirement.

**Figure 3-5: Horizontal Position Accuracy (95%) for Monitoring Period**

Figure 3-6: Vertical Position Accuracy (95%) for Monitoring Period

4. INTEGRITY

The approach taken here is as stated in Section 1.2, with the integrity data generated based on the known positions of the antennas. The basic assumption made is that the receiver is fault free and that its integrity function has a probability of missed detection (Pmd) of 0.001. The process adopted here involves firstly mapping the ICAO requirements to the period under investigation to enable the determination of compliance with ICAO requirements. Given the Pmd of 0.001 and that the integrity risk for NPA is specified as 1×10^{-7} per hour, the SiS probability of failure is determined as 1×10^{-4} per hour. Because of the effect of dynamics and/or contextual factors on aircraft attitude, it is assumed that there are 3600 independent measurements in any given hour. This translates to a probability of failure of 2.78×10^{-8} per sample. Therefore, for the period analysed (i.e. 7862400 samples) the maximum allowable number of failures is 0.22.

The next step compares the positioning solutions as determined from the measurements and the known positions of the antenna. The resulting position errors are then compared to the alert limit for NPA. Finally, the number of violations (the cases where the position errors are larger than the alert limit) is compared to the maximum allowable number of failed satellites (i.e. 0.22). It is on this basis that compliance (or non-compliance) with ICAO's integrity requirements has been determined. It should be noted that this is a rather simple approach as it does not account for the uncertainties in the quantities being compared, particularly in the case of position solutions and the coordinates of the antennas. However, as the Alert Limit is large compared to the normal level of positioning error it is a reasonable approximation.

The distributions of horizontal and vertical errors for the period April to June 2024 were shown in section 3. It was seen that the horizontal errors were usually around 1-2m with a maximum value of less than 7m. As there are no horizontal position errors that are even close to 556m, this means that the integrity requirement was met during the monitoring period.

5. CONTINUITY

The continuity in the monitoring period is computed as:

$$continuity = 1 - \frac{CTI}{MTBF}$$

Where CTI is the continuity time interval (1hr in this case),

MTBF is the mean time between failures, which is computed as total time divided by number of failure events.

A failure event is counted as any period lasting for more than 10 seconds where:

- HPL cannot be computed (i.e. <5 satellites in view above elevation mask);

- Computed HPL > Alert Limit (i.e. 556m);

- Computed horizontal position error > Alert Limit;

- Any combination of the above.

It should be noted that continuity only considers failures due to unscheduled events, and so any periods of high HPL for example that have been previously informed via a NANU are not counted as a failure for continuity. During the monitoring period of April to June 2024 the following potential failure events were observed.

Start Date	Start Time	Outage Duration (secs)	Reason for Outage	Comments
01/05/2024	18:09:00	Various short outages during period until 20:05	Various cases with only 4 SVs (no PL), < 4 SVs (no solution) and some data gaps.	Seems to be a connection issue meaning there is some missing data from the receiver during this time.
25/05/2024	18:26:37	23	Fault detected - Horizontal error > HPL	Seems to be large error (>100m) on PRN07 for this period. This is during the time period of unscheduled NANU 2024030.
13/06/2024	11:36:25	8	Mix of < 4 SVs and only 4 SVs (no HPL)	Loss of low elevation satellites, also associated with drop in SNR. Therefore seems to be local interference.
13/06/2024	12:36:49	7	Only 4 SVs (no HPL)	Loss of low elevation satellites, also associated with drop in SNR. Therefore seems to be local interference.
13/06/2024	12:37:52	14	Mix of < 4 SVs and only 4 SVs (no HPL)	Loss of low elevation satellites, also associated with drop in SNR. Therefore seems to be local interference.
30/06/2024	07:32:18	1	High HPL (>556m)	Loss of low elevation satellites, also associated with drop in SNR. Therefore seems to be local interference.

Table 5-1: Summary of Outages during Monitoring Period

It can be seen that there are several possible events during this period. However, most appear to be due to issues with data loss (either for the receiver or comms for streaming the data to be logged) or

local interference rather than a system problem. The most interesting one is for 25th May as there does appear to be a potential satellite problem on that day. At GMV we have a variety of real-time processing and post-processing of data from receivers at different locations, and we also have COTS receivers continuously logging their own real-time solutions. After further investigation of these different datasets we can see the following:

- The error detailed in the table above is from post-processing of the data from the NOTT receiver, and the same issue is also seen at the same time when post-processing the HARW data, which clearly suggests a satellite problem rather than a local issue of multipath.

- However, looking at the real-time solutions from a selection of COTS receivers at Nottingham, no large position errors are seen at this time and the messages indicate that PRN07 is not being used.

- This is also the case when looking at the real-time processing of NOTT and HARW data – in these results, although there are measurements for PRN07 during the time when the fault appeared in post-processing, the measurements are not used.

- The reason for this is to do with the availability of navigation messages for real-time and post-processing. From NANU 2024030 we can see that the problem with the satellite starts at around 16:20, but at this point it is not in view from the UK. It seems that the satellite stops broadcasting for some time until 18:26:37 and at this point it is in view in the UK, but for real-time processing there is no valid navigation message that has previously been received and so it is not used. When a new navigation message is received at around 18:27 it marks the satellite as unhealthy and so is not used in real-time processing. For post-processing however, which uses a combined set of all navigation messages, this does contain the previous navigation message that was broadcast when the satellite was still healthy and so uses continues to use this – hence giving large position errors – during the short time period from when signals are received again until the new navigation message with unhealthy status is received.

- This post-processing behaviour replicates what we see at other locations where the satellite was in view both at the time the fault originally occurred and when the new navigation message is received. Real-time processing of data from a receiver on Cape Verde show the error on PRN07 growing until just after 16:20 (when NANU 2024030 indicates the problem started), after which the satellite stops broadcasting and is no longer used. Then at 18:26:37 when the signal is broadcast again, the real-time processing continues to use the previously received navigation message, which still indicates the satellite is healthy, and hence shows errors of several hundred metres on PRN07 until the new navigation message with unhealthy status is received at 18:27:00.

- So there does seem to be a potential issue with PRN07 that may have caused errors if the satellite was in view both when the problem first occurred and when the new navigation message with unhealthy status was sent. Although it is noted that this was an easy error to detect with standard RAIM and so is easily detected and alerted. The question is whether this situation could have occurred in the UK. From looking at the satellite position we see that it was above the Southern Atlantic Ocean at the time of the fault, at about the same latitude as the Falkland Islands, and so would not have been in view anywhere in the UK as at that time only receivers located south of about 15 degrees North would have been able to view the satellite. Overall therefore we mark this as not an integrity issue for this UK analysis, noting that this error may have appeared at other locations.

Therefore, if we consider the potential errors from the table above as not being system errors for the UK, we see that the continuity is 100%, which does meet the requirement in this period. However, it is possible that if performance across the whole world is considered then the 100% value for continuity could be optimistic, although to check this more fully further analysis would be required.

6. AVAILABILITY

The availability in the monitoring period is computed as:

$$availability = \frac{MTBO}{MTBO + MTTR}$$

Where MTBO is the mean time between outage, which is computed as total time divided by number of outage events, and MTTR is the mean time to restore, which is computed as total outage time divided by number of outage events.

In the same way as for continuity analysis, outages are identified and used to compute the MTBO and MTTR figures. The difference in this case is that availability includes outages due to scheduled as well as unscheduled outages. Based on the list of outages from Table 5-1 it can be seen that during this period there were no system outages lasting for more than 10 seconds in this period and therefore the availability is 100%. This does fit in with the availability requirements specified in section 2.2.

7. CONCLUSIONS

The GPS performance has been assessed against the ICAO requirements for the period of April to June 2024.

- Accuracy
  - Horizontal accuracy checked against threshold of 220m.
  - 95% horizontal accuracy <6m on each day
  - Accuracy requirement is passed

- Integrity
  - Horizontal error checked against alert limit of 556m.
  - Maximum horizontal errors <7m
  - Integrity requirement is passed.

- Continuity
  - Results checked for outages (<5 satellites, position error > alert limit, protection level > alert limit).
  - No relevant system outages identified (although there is one potential error that may have affected other locations).
  - Continuity is 100% and therefore requirement is met.

- Availability
  - Results checked for outages (<5 satellites, position error > alert limit, protection level > alert limit).
  - No system outages identified.
  - Availability is 100% and therefore requirement is met.

END OF DOCUMENT