# Safety Regulation Group Safety Information and Data Department



# Follow-up Action on Occurrence Report

ACCIDENT TO BOEING B757-3CQ, G-JMAA, AT MANCHESTER INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT ON 23 NOVEMBER 2004
(INTERFERENCE TO ILS SIGNAL DURING AUTOMATIC LANDING)

CAA FACTOR NUMBER : F3/2006

FACTOR PUBLICATION DATE : 11 January 2006

**OPERATOR** : Thomas Cook Airlines UK

CAA OCCURRENCE NUMBER : 2004/08525

AAIB REPORT : Bulletin 1/2006

**SYNOPSIS** 

(From AAIB Report)

The aircraft rolled unexpectedly during the flare phase of an automatic landing at Manchester International Airport. The commander disconnected the autopilots and landed safely. The aircraft rolled in response to temporary interference of the ILS localiser signal caused by a departing Embraer 145 aircraft; this aircraft took off immediately prior to the Boeing 757's landing. Low visibility Procedures (LVPs), which are intended to protect aircraft carrying out automatic landings, had been cancelled a short time before the incident but this information was not communicated to the Boeing 757 crew. Two safety recommendations were made.

#### **FOLLOW UP ACTION**

The two Safety Recommendations, made by the AAIB following their investigation, are reproduced below, together with the CAA's responses.

## Recommendation 2005-98

The Civil Aviation Authority should review the means by which critical information from airports, such as whether Low Visibility Procedures are in force, is communicated to pilots, and its receipt and ongoing accuracy are confirmed, and should take action to eliminate as far as is practicable any weaknesses identified during the review.

#### **CAA Response**

The CAA accepts this recommendation.

The CAA has already commenced a review of CAP168 with regard to Low Visibility Procedure activation/deactivation and communication of same to interested parties including flight crew. Additionally, the CAA will review CAP 493 - Manual Air Traffic Services Part 1 procedures with regard to communication of critical aerodrome information, such as Low Visibility Procedures, to pilots. The Review will be completed by 31 March 2006.

**CAA Status - Open** 

#### Recommendation 2005-99

The Civil Aviation Authority should require providers of air traffic services at aerodromes which have Surface Movement Radar equipment to ensure that arrangements are in place for effective retention of information for a suitable period of time following any incident or accident.

### **CAA Response**

The CAA accepts this recommendation.

The CAA will, in accordance with ICAO Annex 11, Amendment No. 43, para 6.4.1.2, mandate that arrangements are in place for effective retention of recorded Surface Movement Radar surveillance data for a minimum of 30 days. It is planned to implement this mandate by 31 March 2006.

**CAA Status - Open**