Safety Regulation Group Safety Investigation and Data Department



Follow-up Action on Occurrence Report

ACCIDENT TO YAK 52, G-YAKW, TWO MILES NE OF TOWCESTER ON 5 JANUARY 2003
(AIRCRAFT CRASHED WHEN SCREWDRIVER JAMMED ELEVATOR CONTROL)

CAA FACTOR NUMBER : F37/2003

FACTOR PUBLICATION DATE : 10 November 2003

OPERATOR : Private

CAA OCCURRENCE NUMBER : 2003/00010

AAIB REPORT : Bulletin 10/2003

SYNOPSIS

(From AAIB Report)

The pilot was a member of a syndicate who operated the aircraft from a private farm strip at Cuddesdon, Oxfordshire. On the morning of the accident he arrived at the farm strip with his brother who was to fly in the rear seat as a passenger. His brother was also a qualified pilot although less experienced. The aircraft, which was started with the help of another syndicate member, then departed Cuddesdon and flew to Turweston Airfield to refuel. The pilot and passenger re-entered the cockpit when the refuelling was complete. Both were seen to be wearing flying suits, parachutes and helmets. They then departed Turweston, from Runway 27, at 1110 hrs and flew to the north-east. The pilot informed the air ground radio operator that they were intending to carry out aerobatics to the north-east of the airfield for approximately 30 minutes before returning to Turweston to refuel again. The weather in the area was fine with no cloud, a light north-westerly wind and a temperature of +1°C.

Five minutes later the aircraft was observed flying aerobatics 2 miles to the north-east of Towcester. After flying a sequence of manoeuvres lasting approximately 10 minutes the aircraft was seen to enter a vertical climb and execute a stall turn. The aircraft completed the manoeuvre and began a vertical descent, from which there was no apparent sign of recovery. It impacted the ground directly beneath power lines without disrupting the electrical supply. There was no fire and the rescue services arrived at the scene 15 minutes later. Both pilot and passenger were fatally injured.

FOLLOW UP ACTION

The two Safety Recommendations, made by the AAIB following their investigation, are reproduced below, together with the CAA's responses.

Recommendation 2003-71

The CAA should require the Yak-52, and aircraft of a similar design operating on the UK register, to have fitted a method of preventing loose articles migrating to a position where they could interfere with the operation or jam the flight controls.

CAA Response

The CAA partially accepts this Recommendation.

The CAA will consider requiring the Yak 52 and aircraft of a similar design operating on the UK register, to have fitted a method of preventing loose articles migrating to a position where they could interfere with the operation or jam the flight controls.

The CAA will complete its consideration by end February 2004.

CAA Status - Open

Recommendation 2003-72

The CAA should publicise the circumstances of this accident in order to bring to the attention of Licenced Engineers (LAE) and maintenance organisations the need for them to have in place an effective tool system that reduces the likelihood of tools being left in aircraft after maintenance.

CAA Response

The CAA accepts this Recommendation.

The CAA will publicise the circumstances of this accident, including the need to have in place an effective tool system that reduces the likelihood of tools being left in aircraft, by means of an article in GASIL in November 2003 and an Airworthiness Notice in March 2004.

CAA Status - Open