Aviation Safety Investigation Report 199800517

Boeing Co B767

**13 February 1998** 

Readers are advised that the Australian Transport Safety Bureau investigates for the sole purpose of enhancing transport safety. Consequently, Bureau reports are confined to matters of safety significance and may be misleading if used for any other purposes.

Investigations commenced on or before 30 June 2003, including the publication of reports as a result of those investigations, are authorised by the Executive Director of the Bureau in accordance with Part 2A of the Air Navigation Act 1920.

Investigations commenced after 1 July 2003, including the publication of reports as a result of those investigations, are authorised by the Executive Director of the Bureau in accordance with the Transport Safety Investigation Act 2003 (TSI Act). Reports released under the TSI Act are not admissible as evidence in any civil or criminal proceedings.

NOTE: All air safety occurrences reported to the ATSB are categorised and recorded. For a detailed explanation on Category definitions please refer to the ATSB website at www.atsb.gov.au.

## Aviation Safety Investigation Report 199800517

Occurrence Number:		Occurrence Type	: Incident		
Location:	Sydney, Aerodrome				
State:	VIC	Inv Category:	4		
Date:	Friday 13 February 199	8			
Time:	0730 hours	Time Zone	ESuT		
Highest Injury Level: None					
Aircraft	Boeing Co				
Manufacturer:					
Aircraft Model:	767-238				
Aircraft Registration:	VH-EAJ			Serial	23304
				Number:	
Type of Operation:	Air Transport Dome Scheduled	estic High Capacity P	assenger		
Damage to Aircraft:	Nil				
<b>Departure Point:</b>	Sydney NSW				
Departure Time:	0730 ESuT				
Destination:	Perth WA				

Approved for Release: Tuesday, August 18, 1998

The Boeing B767 aircraft was operating an RPT passenger service from Sydney direct to Perth. As the aircraft was rotated for lift-off the co-pilot, who was the handling pilot for the flight, found that the aircraft was very nose heavy. The crew contacted load control and requested a loading check. The check disclosed that 400 kg of cargo had been loaded into position 11, the most forward bay, and this load had not been entered into the loading data. The crew received revised stabiliser trim settings which were confirmed during the arrival into Perth.

The investigation found that the load controller had established what load had to be loaded onto the aircraft and had made the relevant weight and balance computations. However the load controller had not locked out the computer field related to freight as is required by the relevant procedures. This allowed the aircraft loaders to load the additional cargo and make an entry into the computer. This entry did not become obvious to the load controller and, because the load controller thought there was no changes to the original computations, the crew were not advised to reconfigure the aircraft.

The operator has instituted training procedures designed to improve discipline in the loading system.