

# CAP 632 News

Edition 1 (Spring 2005)



© jPb-imagery

Welcome to the first edition of the CAP632 News. The intention is to publish this newsletter each Spring. I hope that you find it informative!

The number of operators and aircraft under CAP632 has steadily grown since the introduction of CAP632 in 1995, and currently there are more than 150 aircraft and 69 operators. The need for sharing information and ideas is even more important, please feel free to contribute to this publication.

---

## CAP632 ANNUAL RETURNS

As I'm sure some of you noticed, only

the jet operators were lucky enough to receive a return!

Response was positive and this coming year we shall amend the form to remove the list of pilots. You can rest assured that we are not planning any other forms this year and hope that this did not take too much of your valuable time. Top marks to Tony Haig-Thomas who was first to complete his return!

---

## JET EXEMPTIONS

After a long(ish) debate the decision was taken to keep the issuance of Type Rating Exemptions within Personnel Licensing Dept (PLD). The

contact is Dave Conduit on 01293 57 3559

---

## **EJECTION SEATS – A PERSONAL VIEW FROM ROBB METCALFE**

During an audit last year I heard a story that a pilot flying a gun ejection seat equipped jet flew with the pins in, because he was afraid if he ejected he would damage his back.

Apart from my 30 hour Air Training Corps Flying Scholarship PPL – yes back in 1964 a PPL could be obtained in 30 hours – I spent the first 30 years of my flying career sitting on an ejection seat. Indeed the first time I used my PPL – in 1991 – was to fly a civil registered Canberra fitted with, you've guessed it, EJECTION SEATS.

Fortunately I've never had to use one in anger, though I have been close, holding the handle twice, but lots of my RAF colleagues owe their lives to Martin Baker. My attitude to ejection seats is very positive, and I would have not the slightest hesitation in using one. I accept that a gun-seat may cause compression fractures of my spine but not using the seat might result in even greater fractures of other important bits of me.

And back injuries are not a guaranteed outcome. In 1982 two friends of mine ejected from a Canberra in Cyprus one Friday morning. The Canberra is fitted with Martin Baker Type 2CA seats. Not quite the original seat but not far beyond. They have a 90 kts straight and level, ground level capability (10% of any rate of descent) and are well proven. Although the pilot who ejected in an extremely bad posture was injured, the navigator was flying again the following Monday! The pilot

returned to flying Canberras some 6 months later.

The point? Do not be afraid to use an ejection seat, it may hurt your back but – within seat limits – it won't kill you, not using the seat in time might. Don't worry about the aircraft, they're replaceable – you're not. Remember:

**EJECT IN TIME !**

---

## **DISPLAYS - NO PASSENGERS**

In exceptional circumstances, we would consider the issuance of a Permission, on safety grounds, for a suitably trained second pilot/crew member to occupy the second seat in a side-by-side aircraft during an air display to provide improved lookout. For example the Pembroke or the Anson, but **not** the JP or Hunter T7. However, once a Permission has been issued, the aircraft may only be flown in an air display with a crew of two. Approval to fly tandem-seat aircraft two up during a solo air display will not be granted.

---

## **CHANGES TO OCMs**

Please keep either Dave Evans, Robb Metcalfe or myself (George Duncan) informed of changes to your OCMs (as required by CAP632). Please note that an aircraft cannot be operated on two OCMs at the same time!

---

## **LOW FLYING**

As you may have seen recently in the media the RAF has been "blamed" for the death of a young woman who was thrown from her horse when a low flying Chinook flew near to where she was riding. This is not the first time an

aircraft has been “blamed” for a ground incident but apparently new coroners’ court procedures now allow the “layman” jury to add to a verdict of say accidental death any causal factors they believe rightly or wrongly may have contributed to the accident.

It goes without saying how a Hunter or Spitfire displaying at low level would be received!

---

## **SMS**

### **GENERAL AVIATION SAFETY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM AND RISK ASSESSMENT**

The requirement for the provision of auditable safety management systems by those undertaking activities that may impinge on public safety has developed in the wake of the Piper Alpha Disaster, the Kings Cross Fire, the Herald of Free Enterprise sinking and the Lyme Bay canoeing tragedy. The proposed system provides a simple self-assessment checklist and indicates how auditing will be achieved. It also offers a simple risk assessment process.

Most of you will already be operating an SMS or something very akin to it, even though you may not have thought of it under that guise. Similarly, we have audited your safety processes but not referred to them as an SMS. Thus the proposal is not the introduction of a new requirement, rather the formalisation of an existing process.

Obviously, your safety process will have varied depending on whether you are a relatively large organisation or a one man operation, and the proposal accepts this fact. The checklist is designed to cover multi-personnel, multi-aircraft organisations but easily adjusts to meet the needs of the small

operator by deleting the non-relevant questions.

The risk assessment process offered is also designed to allow its employment by both large and small operations. The hazards exemplified cover the whole gamut of GA operations from public transport balloons through air display flying to model aircraft displays.

---

## **FLIGHT TESTS**

There are two types of Flight Test applicable to CAP632 aircraft. For the initial issue of a Permit, or if the aircraft has been rebuilt, then the aircraft has to complete the more rigorous “233 Flight Test Schedule”. Before a pilot is authorised to perform this airtest a copy of the Schedule and a NEW briefing MUST be obtained from Flight Department, for each flight test.

For Continued Airworthiness (ie Permit renewals), the aircraft must complete an agreed Flight Test Schedule. This schedule is often based upon the “Approved Flight Test Schedule 2 (AFTS 2)” and is tailored to the specific aircraft type. Again approval must be sort from the Flight Department for each flight test.

Pilots wishing to conduct Flight Tests must receive a full brief from the CAA Flight Department PRIOR to undertaking ANY Flight Test. Contact Paul Mulcahy on 01293 57 3106

---

## **MUSTANG, HALF CUBAN – CLIMBING - 1000’ - SILENCE...**

Following an incident in July 2004, the author has kindly agreed to his description of events being reproduced. An engine failure in a heavy piston never happens at the right time...

“After having rolled to the right off a half Cuban manoeuvre along R/W 10 with the engine set and pulled up into a steep wingover to the left returning along the axis of the R/W 28 with a roll to the right of the airstrip. I continued the roll and climbed away moderately steeply and at reaching height, which I estimate was under 1000’ agl the engine cut out completely. At the time I estimate I had 20-30 Nose up and 20-30 degrees Right bank, and 200+ kts. The cut felt like fuel starvation – the engine went silent without any ‘bangs’. I was still set at 2650 rpm. I did this by rotating the fuel selector two clicks anticlockwise. I maintained the back pressure on the stick, the a/c therefore continued to climb whilst I increased the right bank initially with the intention of staying as close as possible to the strip. I could not see the strip at the time of the engine cut, since it was behind me. It was an entirely voluntary response.

I was surprised and concerned that the engine did not restart so my next action was to put the prop into ‘full course’ pitch and prepare for an EOL. By now the climb had ceased and the a/c was descending in a 180° RH opening turn in the direction of the local village. I was alarmed at how quickly I was descending. It now looked highly unlikely that I could make it back to the strip. I also observed that my speed had decayed to 135kt. Therefore, I decided to change my plan and head out into open country away from obstacles for an EOL in a very large field that was more or less behind me. I estimate I was at about 700’ – 800’ agl in a valley when I made this decision whilst in a gentle RH gliding turn having by now rolled off most of the bank.

I therefore pushed the nose down very steeply, probably down to 45° in order to regain airspeed, and at the same

time increased the angle of bank up to probably 75° in order to avoid a steep bank, trees and 33,000 Volt HT wires into which I was heading. The aircraft felt just about OK but I still needed to turn through at least half a turn in order to head out in the direction I had chosen. Thereafter, with 150kt restored I started rolling off the bank and pulling out of the spiral. Having levelled the a/c at 200’ agl. I came out heading N along the LH side of a valley with horse gallops to my right in the bottom of a valley. The descending turn looked absolutely horrid from inside the cockpit and I recall referring to the ball and ASI as I pulled out.

I remember being very conscious of airspeed. My angle of descent had now considerably reduced since the check I had made earlier when at 700’; nevertheless I was still descending over ground that drops away, whilst at the same time maintaining 150kts. I had contemplated putting down in the long field that I was over and parallel to the gallops but the undulations were very severe and at the 150kts at which I was still doing it was a stark option, which I rejected.

The options up ahead were not looking good as the valley was narrowing into a large cluster of trees, farmhouse and barns. Over on the right things were not any better as the slope going up from the gallops on the other side of the valley was particularly steep and rugged.

I therefore elected to turn left using about 20-30° of bank taking me to the top of what was a gentle up gradient of some 500m. I came out on the crest of this gradient.

I can remember that I was conscious of the wind being from about this direction. The wind was not predominant in my mind. Finding a

place to park the 'plane certainly was and by now my second choice of landing spot had passed.

I was very aware of where the selected heading would take me. I was still overhead farmland that I walk and fly over frequently, however I was heading further out into what I knew to be open and uninhabited countryside.

Somewhere after and/or during the paralleling of the horse gallops I recall I had a further go at the engine restart by reselecting the fuel cock and trying different throttle openings. The engine did not appear to respond. I was already committed in my mind and concentrated on bringing off an EOL.

I recall observing that my speed had decayed to 120kts at that point. I was presented with two quite large open fields with yellow and green crops respectively. It looked that now I had a very good option to succeed in finally having a place to land and I chose the second field, selecting full flap and at the same time changed course with about 15° right bank and headed for flatter piece of ground that I was now able to identify more clearly. I rounded out gently at what I estimate was 80-85kts into what turned out to be a tall crop of broad beans.

I remember paying particular attention to keeping the wings parallel to the slope. I also remember that there appeared to be no drift. I deliberately did not select gear.

I recall my consciousness of being more preoccupied with 'flying the 'plane' than trying to solve the mechanical problem. I remember several times calling out aloud 'Fly the 'Plane'. The vitals on my mind were:

- Switch Fuel Tank
- 150kts
- Get the 'Prop' back
- 'Ball' in middle in turns

- Do not put the Gear Down
- Ensure wings are absolutely parallel with the ground at point of put down.

By coincidence (and possibly fortune?) I had had the opportunity of spending 10-15 minutes discussing this very situation the night before with a very experienced 2000+hr and current Mustang instructor..."

---

## US HUNTER !!

Accidents often have many causal factors which in themselves are not sufficient to cause the accident, but when linked lead to the accident. We are always striving to break that chain. We received the following extract from the NTSB:

Accident occurred 22 July 2003 in Pittston, PA, USA  
Aircraft: Hawker T Mk 7A, registration: NONE  
Injuries: 1 Fatal.

The pilot of the Hawker Hunter performed three aborted takeoffs in the 4 days that preceded the accident flight. A witness reported that each time, the pilot reported the brakes were dragging. The pilot also reported the engine was running "cool", but was OK. On the fourth attempted takeoff, witnesses reported the engine did not sound as loud as they expected and the airplane appeared slow. At the end of the 7,500 foot runway, the airplane abruptly pitched up, became airborne with wings rocking from side to side, and then disappeared below the level of the runway. The airplane impacted in an open field, below the level of the runway, in a nose high attitude and travelled into a wooded area. The pilot initiated ejection; however, the canopy did not separate from the airplane and the seat went through it. Three of the four canopy locks were found still

locked. Water was found in the fuel filter. The airplane had received a replacement engine a month earlier, but was not signed off as airworthy. When the engine was ground run after the change, it was found to not meet two separate acceleration tests. The owner reported the maintenance records were on the airplane; however, none were found, and he never produced any documents to determine the airworthiness of the airplane. The last known annual inspection occurred 13 months prior to the flight. The airplane had been in non-preserved storage for over a year. The owner had de-registered the airplane with the FAA, with the intent of moving it to Canada; however, he had not applied for Canadian registration. After each aborted takeoff, the airplane was worked on by two non-certificated mechanics.

The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident as follows:

The pilot's failure to abort the takeoff, after the engine experienced a partial power loss for undetermined reasons. Factors were the pilot's improper preflight planning by his failure to determine if the airplane was airworthy, and the operators inadequate maintenance on the airplane, the use of non-certificated mechanics to perform the work on the airplane, and his failure to ensure the airplane met the minimum standards necessary for flight.

---

## **250 KNOT EXEMPTIONS**

A reminder that all 250 knot exemptions expire on the 31 March 2005. Please send in your renewals in good time, to ensure that you are legal!!

---

### **EKQs**

Now is a great time of year to refresh your knowledge of all those facts and figures. Dust off your Essential Knowledge Quizzes (EKQs) and test your knowledge...

---

### **MORs**

Considering the number of CAP632 aircraft now in the UK, only a handful of MORs have been submitted. Whilst this is definitely good news, over half of these are related to airspace infringements.

Whilst we have time to reflect during the winter months, perhaps more time allocated to planning before a flight would help to reduce the number of airspace infringements. Mileage disappears rapidly at 250kts, so aim to get clearances in good time – it all comes back to planning. The Mandatory Occurrence Reports (MORs) for Ex-military Aircraft that occurred during 2004 are as follows:

---

# Mandatory Occurrence Reports

Date Printed : 10 March 2005

## Safety Regulation Group

Safety Investigation & Data Department

Aviation House  
Gatwick Airport South  
West Sussex  
RH6 0YR

Direct Dial 01293 573220  
Direct Fax 01293 573972  
E-mail [sdd@srg.caa.co.uk](mailto:sdd@srg.caa.co.uk)

Switchboard 01293 567171  
Fax 01293 573999  
Telex 878753

*These records were retrieved from the UK CAA Mandatory Occurrence Reporting (MOR) system by a member of the SIDD Department*

*The MOR system records include information reported to the CAA, information obtained from CAA investigations, and deductions by CAA staff based on the available information. The authenticity of the contents or the absence of errors and omissions cannot be guaranteed. Records in this system commenced on 1 January 1976 coincident with the introduction of Mandatory Occurrence Reporting in the UK, but occurrences reported voluntarily are also included, and no distinction is made between them.*

**Note: Any data provided from these records are made available on the understanding that they are only to be used for purposes of Flight Safety and must not be used for other purposes.**

**SUBJECT: MORs on 'Permit to Fly' aircraft.**  
**PERIOD: 1 January 2004 to 31 December 2004**

---

<b>A/C Type :</b>	Glider	<b>Occurrence Number :</b>	<b>200400506</b>
<b>Flight Phase :</b>	Cruise	<b>Occurrence Date :</b>	24 Jan 2004
<b>Classification :</b>	Occurrences	<b>Location :</b>	Nympsfield
<b>Events :</b>	UK Airprox (non ATC related)	<b>Location Info :</b>	2SW

**Pretitle :**

*UK AIRPROX 6/2004 - Glider and Hunter at 2000ft, 2nm Southwest of Nympsfield.*

**Precis :**

CAA Closure: Appropriate CAA action has been taken as a result of this AIRPROX. This AIRPROX will be subject to a separate review by the United Kingdom AIRPROX Board (UKAB).

---

<b>A/C Type :</b>	Jet Provost	<b>Occurrence Number :</b>	<b>200402236</b>
<b>Flight Phase :</b>	Descent	<b>Occurrence Date :</b>	11 Apr 2004
<b>Classification :</b>	Occurrences	<b>Location :</b>	Brookmans Park (BPK)
<b>Events :</b>	Airspace Infringement	<b>Location Info :</b>	4 ESE

**Pretitle :**

*Alleged infringement of the Stansted CTA (Class D). Traffic info was given to an inbound B737. Standard separation maintained.*

**Precis :**

---

**Note: Any data provided from these records are made available on the understanding that they are only to be used for purposes of Flight Safety and must not be used for other purposes.**

---

---

<b>A/C Type :</b>	Hunter	<b>Occurrence Number :</b>	<b>200402686</b>
<b>Flight Phase :</b>	Flight	<b>Occurrence Date :</b>	27 Apr 2004
<b>Classification :</b>	Occurrences	<b>Location :</b>	Yeovilton
<b>Events :</b>	Airspace Infringement	<b>Location Info :</b>	

**Pretitle :**

*Unauthorised approach due to misunderstanding by the pilots.*

**Precis :**

The aircraft was routing west of Yeovilton, intending to operate at Yeovil Judwin, when it was seen with the landing gear lowering and making an approach to Runway 27 at Yeovilton. ATC transmitted a blind transmission on Channel 1, selected the runway 'traffic lights' to Red and fired a 'Verey'. The aircraft flew along the runway at approximately 20ft, narrowly missing a tractor than had been cleared to cross the runway, before the aircraft turned in a south-easterly direction and climbed away. The airfield was active with a military jet aircraft in the hover at 50ft over a landing pad and a helicopter hover taxiing. The pilot's report puts the whole incident down to a misunderstanding by the foreign pilots over the difference between Yeovil and Yeovilton.

CAA Closure: The hazard is acceptable provided the frequency remains low.

---

<b>A/C Type :</b>	Aero L29 Delfin	<b>Occurrence Number :</b>	<b>200403215</b>
<b>Flight Phase :</b>	Cruise	<b>Occurrence Date :</b>	17 May 2004
<b>Classification :</b>	Occurrences	<b>Location :</b>	Manston
<b>Events :</b>	ATC Occurrence	<b>Location Info :</b>	

**Pretitle :**

*L29 allegedly failed to follow ATC instructions whilst transiting the Manston ATZ. Traffic info given.*

**Precis :**

---

<b>A/C Type :</b>	Hunter	<b>Occurrence Number :</b>	<b>200403423</b>
<b>Flight Phase :</b>	Landing	<b>Occurrence Date :</b>	30 May 2004
<b>Classification :</b>	UK Reportable Accident	<b>Location :</b>	Southend (SND)
<b>Events :</b>	Reportable Accident Flight Crew Occurrence Loss of A/c Control	<b>Location Info :</b>	

**Pretitle :**

*Tail struck runway during landing flare. Substantial damage. No injuries to 1 POB. AAIB AARF investigation.*

**Precis :**

The accident flight had originated at Kemble Airfield before carrying out a flying display in the Southend area and landing on Runway 24 at Southend Airport. The aircraft was fitted with 150 gallon drop tanks on the inboard underwing stations and had approximately 1700 to 2200lbs of fuel on board, giving an approach speed of 135kts, which was maintained throughout the final approach. In a Hunter aircraft the approach angle during the latter stages of a visual approach is usually less than 3deg but in this instance the pilot elected to fly a steeper approach (approximately 3.5deg) due to obstructions below the approach path to the runway. The weather conditions were fine, with a surface wind from approximately 240deg at 8 to 12kts. After touchdown the braking parachute was streamed as usual, but the pilot thought that the tail may have contacted the runway at the same time as the main undercarriage. An external inspection confirmed this, revealing damage to the tailcone and jetpipe, which had been punctured when the tailskid detached from the tailcone. The pilot stated that he had landed with the tailplane interconnect switched 'ON' which made the aircraft more sensitive in pitch during the flare manoeuvre. This was the normal position of the switch during an air display and whilst manoeuvring at high speeds. Although he had landed in this configuration before and without difficulty, he had intended to place the tailplane interconnect switch 'OFF' and,

---

---

temporarily forgetting the status of the system, had not made due allowance in his landing technique. The pilot also stated that he had deliberately aimed for a smooth landing in order to reduce wear on the tyres. For reasons of control sensitivity, the Aircrew Manual for the type recommends that the interconnections be switched to 'OFF' for take off and landing. The pilot considered that the combination of the steeper approach path, the engaged status of the tailplane interconnect system and the desire for a smooth landing had contributed to a misjudged flare, as a result of which the tail struck the runway. The pilot further commented that other types he was current on at the time were all tail wheel aircraft. He thought that this may have lead to him accepting a higher than normal pitch attitude during landing. See also AAIB Bulletin 9/2004, ref: EW/G2004/05/21 and occurrence 199903904.

CAA Closure: No CAA action appropriate.

---

---

<b>A/C Type :</b>	Jet Provost	<b>Occurrence Number :</b>	<b>200403570</b>
<b>Flight Phase :</b>	Cruise	<b>Occurrence Date :</b>	31 May 2004
<b>Classification :</b>	Occurrences	<b>Location :</b>	Southend (SND)
<b>Events :</b>	Airspace Infringement	<b>Location Info :</b>	

**Pretitle :**

*Infringement of the Southend Airshow TRA by a Jet Provost just prior to a parachute drop of the RAF Falcons.*

**Precis :**

CAA Closure: Appropriate CAA action being taken.

---

---

<b>A/C Type :</b>	Other	<b>Occurrence Number :</b>	<b>200403705</b>
<b>Flight Phase :</b>	Cruise	<b>Occurrence Date :</b>	07 Jun 2004
<b>Classification :</b>	Occurrences	<b>Location :</b>	Belfast (BEL)
<b>Events :</b>	Navigation Error Flight Crew Occurrence Diversion /Return A/c Equipment / System Malfunction	<b>Location Info :</b>	20 S W

**Pretitle :**

*Pilot unsure of position and experiencing radio difficulties. Position fixed using DF. Diverted to Belfast Aldergrove and landed safely.*

**Precis :**

Pilot advised ATC that he was unsure of his position. Position was fixed using DF and passed to pilot who elected to continue on his own navigation. On approaching the Northern Ireland coast the pilot was advised of the base of L10. The pilot again stated that he was unsure of his position and L10. The aircraft then completed a 360deg turn and the pilot advised that he was unable to change radio frequencies and that he wished to return to Londonderry. The pilot was persuaded to divert to Belfast Aldergrove as he was VFR on top, but unable to descend through cloud (BKN 2800). The aircraft was vectored over Lough Neagh, where the aircraft broke cloud and landed safely at Belfast Aldergrove.

---

---

<b>A/C Type :</b>	P51 Mustang	<b>Occurrence Number :</b>	<b>200404753</b>
<b>Flight Phase :</b>	Landing	<b>Occurrence Date :</b>	17 Jul 2004
<b>Classification :</b>	UK Reportable Accident	<b>Location :</b>	East Garston
<b>Events :</b>	Reportable Accident Wheels Up Landing	<b>Location Info :</b>	N W

**Pretitle :**

*AAIB Initial Notification: Wheels up landing. Damage to propeller. No injuries to 1 POB. Subject to AAIB AARF investigation.*

**Precis :**

---

---

<b>A/C Type :</b>	Hurricane	<b>Occurrence Number :</b>	<b>200405662</b>
<b>Flight Phase :</b>	Initial Climb	<b>Occurrence Date :</b>	08 Aug 2004
<b>Classification :</b>	Occurrences	<b>Location :</b>	White Waltham
<b>Events :</b>	Engine Malfunction Diversion /Return	<b>Location Info :</b>	

**Pretitle :**

*AAIB Initial Notification: Aircraft returned due to rough running engine. Nr1 cylinder inlet valve seat unscrewed.*

**Precis :**

---

---

<b>A/C Type :</b>	Vampire	<b>Occurrence Number :</b>	<b>200406145</b>
<b>Flight Phase :</b>	Climb	<b>Occurrence Date :</b>	30 Aug 2004
<b>Classification :</b>	Occurrences	<b>Location :</b>	Honiley (HON)
<b>Events :</b>	Airspace Infringement	<b>Location Info :</b>	

**Pretitle :**

*A Vampire departed Coventry R/W23 and told to remain outside CAS, but failed to turn correctly and allegedly infringed the Birmingham CTR (Class D). Standard separation maintained.*

**Precis :**

---

---

<b>A/C Type :</b>	F86 Sabre	<b>Occurrence Number :</b>	<b>200406324</b>
<b>Flight Phase :</b>	Cruise	<b>Occurrence Date :</b>	03 Sep 2004
<b>Classification :</b>	Occurrences	<b>Location :</b>	Stansted
<b>Events :</b>	Airspace Infringement Loss of Standard Separation	<b>Location Info :</b>	15NE

**Pretitle :**

*Infringement of LTMA (Class A) by F86 Sabre at 5000ft, 15nm Northeast of Stansted. Avoiding action and traffic info issued to B737 inbound to Stansted.*

**Precis :**

Separation lost between the F86 and the B737.

CAA Closure: Appropriate CAA action has been taken as a result of this incident.

---

---

<b>A/C Type :</b>	Vampire	<b>Occurrence Number :</b>	<b>200406633</b>
<b>Flight Phase :</b>	Descent	<b>Occurrence Date :</b>	05 Sep 2004
<b>Classification :</b>	Occurrences	<b>Location :</b>	5038N 00125W
<b>Events :</b>	ATC Occurrence	<b>Location Info :</b>	

**Pretitle :**

*Alleged infringement of Airway N866 by Vampire at FL50, 5038N 00125W. Conflict with BAe146, also at FL50, within Airway. STCA activated. Traffic info issued.*

**Precis :**

LACC ATS Investigation concludes that transponder returns from the Vampire were intermittent. The radar trace shows the Vampire crossing the boundary of the Solent CTA at 2400 feet and therefore below CAS. It is concluded that the Vampire did not actually infringe CAS and there was no loss of separation.

CAA Closure: No further CAA action required at this time.

---

---

<b>A/C Type :</b>	GNAT	<b>Occurrence Number :</b>	<b>200406686</b>
<b>Flight Phase :</b>	Approach	<b>Occurrence Date :</b>	17 Sep 2004
<b>Classification :</b>	UK Reportable Accident	<b>Location :</b>	North Weald
<b>Events :</b>	Reportable Accident Adverse Weather Diversion /Return Engine Malfunction	<b>Location Info :</b>	1/2 mile north

**Pretitle :**

*AAIB Initial Notification: Aircraft Accident - Subject to AAIB Field Investigation.*

**Precis :**

Aircraft returned to North Weald due to bad weather en-route. Engine problems and landed wheels-up in a field. No ejection. Damage to underside of aircraft. 2 POB, no injuries. Ejection seats made safe and battery removed.

---

---

<b>A/C Type :</b>	Jet Provost	<b>Occurrence Number :</b>	<b>200408295</b>
<b>Flight Phase :</b>	Cruise	<b>Occurrence Date :</b>	13 Nov 2004
<b>Classification :</b>	Occurrences	<b>Location :</b>	Norwich
<b>Events :</b>	Airspace Infringement	<b>Location Info :</b>	S

**Pretitle :**

*Alleged infringement of UIR (Class B) by a Jet Provost. Standard separation maintained.*

**Precis :**

Appropriate CAA action has been taken as a result of this incident.

---

---

<b>A/C Type :</b>	Aero L39 Albatros	<b>Occurrence Number :</b>	<b>200409046</b>
<b>Flight Phase :</b>	Take Off	<b>Occurrence Date :</b>	10 Dec 2004
<b>Classification :</b>	UK Reportable Accident	<b>Location :</b>	Manston
<b>Events :</b>	Reportable Accident Detached A/c Part	<b>Location Info :</b>	

**Pretitle :**

*AAIB Initial Notification: Rear canopy separated from aircraft during take off. Aircraft returned and landed safely. No injury to 1 POB. Subject to AAIB AARF investigation.*

**Precis :**

Canopy found on R/W.

---

---

<b>A/C Type :</b>	GNAT	<b>Occurrence Number :</b>	<b>200409062</b>
<b>Flight Phase :</b>	Cruise	<b>Occurrence Date :</b>	15 Dec 2004
<b>Classification :</b>	Occurrences	<b>Location :</b>	Luton (LUT)
<b>Events :</b>	Airspace Infringement	<b>Location Info :</b>	S

**Pretitle :**

*Gnat allegedly infringed Luton CAS (Class D) and the Panshanger ATZ. Subsequently, Gnat pilot reported that the GPS had failed and the weather was poor. Luton departures were stopped.*

**Precis :**

---

Number of Records : 16

---

---

## CHARGES FOR 2005

The CAA Scheme of Charges (General Aviation) are published in the CAA Official Record Series. Copies can be viewed on the internet at <http://www.caa.co.uk/docs/33/ORS5~200.pdf> (GA) and <http://www.caa.co.uk/docs/33/ORS5~197.PDF> (PLD)

The relevant charges, which came into effect on 01 Apr 2004, and will be next reviewed on 01 Oct 2005. These are summarised below:

### (a) EXEMPTION FROM ARTICLE 56

The dropping of articles. (The dropping of ashes and flower petals at any religious service are exempt from charges, although an Exemption is still required)

Exemption issue (single drop)	£94
Exemption issue (2 or more drops)	£188

### (b) EXEMPTION FROM RULE 5

Low flying – 500ft rule – Rule 5(1)(e): Where 3 or less a/c are involved	£94
---	-----

### (c) EXEMPTION FROM RULE 23

Flight in Excess of 250kt below FL100 (exemptions valid until 31 March)	
For a single aircraft	£94
For 2 or more aircraft	£188

### (d) COPIES OF DOCUMENTS

A charge is payable for copies or replacements of documents.	
Copy or replacement document	£18

### (e) TYPE RATING EXEMPTIONS

A charge is payable for the issue of a type rating exemption.	
Initial issue	£44
Variation or amendment	£21

Note: When an application is made which specifies the same venue and date in respect of more than one Exemption described in Paragraphs (a) or (b) above, the total charge to be paid shall be the highest of the appropriate charges specified in those paragraphs. As always, if you have any queries regarding which charge is payable, a call to the GA Department on 01293 573526 should clarify the situation.

---